[EM] 7 ballots in voting systems poll

As of now, 7 people have voted in the voting systems poll. Only about 2 days of balloting remain. Mike Ossipoff _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com

[EM] More re: Blake's example

I should add that Blake's example below, in addition to being an example of Margins' easy order-reversal gain, is also an example of Margins yielding to mere truncation. But Blake didn't have to go to all that trouble--I'd already posted examples of that. 45 A B C 20 B A C 35 C B A Mike Ossipof

[EM] Usefulness of mathematics

Anthony said: You're not telling me that people routinely object to any post not explicitly justified by direct reference to concerns actually stated by large numbers of voters, are you? I reply: I don't know, did I tell you that? No, I didn't object to postings whose arguments were irrelevan

[EM] Maths usefulness

>> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF >> Subject: Re: Richard & the diagram >> >I think it should be pointed out that "distances from lines >> >drawn on a diagram" is not something different from the >> >concerns of the voter-on-the-street, but merely a more >> >precise picture of it. >> Fine. But I must have

RE: Blake reply

Mr. Ossipoff wrote-- My concern about truncation is due to its common incidence in all rank ballotings, and Margins' vulnerability to it. --- D- There is obviously a very major concern about truncation in ANY method if there is no majority requirement. That is, Plurality is the result. 26 A 2

Re: Medians (was Re: [EM] Absolute Utilities)

Forest Simmons wrote: > I will argue in another posting that in general maximizing mean utility is > less democratic than maximizing median utility, which in turn is less > democratic than maximizing (number of voters receiving) acceptable utility > (which corresponds to Approval). I'm going t

Re: Medians (was Re: [EM] Absolute Utilities)

Thanks for the example Bart. I had found a similar one myself. But I'm not convinced that the majority candidate is more democratic than the median candidate, just as I am not convinced that the majority candidate is better than the Approval candidate. Presumably in the example below there are ot

Re: [EM] number of ways to vote a ranked ballot.

Excellent. Thanks both of you for your help. :) In case anyone is interested, I plugged that into Excel to calculate the first 25 results, and played around with formulas for a while: I settled on B(N)= int( N! x exp(N*B) x C ). With B=0.3666 and C=0.7213 (aprox). With the correct values of B

Re: [EM] Approval Runoff

I would like to make a couple of suggestions relating to Approval Runoff that address your questions. 1. The natural ballots for Instant Approval Runoff are Dyadic Approval Ballots. At each stage of the runoff the coarsest remaining inequality is the current approval cutoff. Remember that on Dya

[EM] Equal defeats in RP(m)?

Someone has designated Ranked Pairs(margins), and so it's necessary to ask for a complete definition of it. In particular, how exactly does it deal with equal defeats, in all the kinds of situations in which they can occur and in all the procedural questions they can raise in an RP(m) count? Obv