I spoke incorrectly yesterday when I said that none of the defensive
strategy criteria mention the CW. SFC mentions the sincere CW.
GSFC mentions the sincere Smith set.
Here's what these criteria guarantee for a complying method (wv methods):
With wv methods, a group consisting of a majority of
One example I had in mind was Rwanda. Majority rule or minority rule,
same result: genocide. Solution: compromise candidate with approval from
both extremes.
Forest
On Sat, 5 May 2001, Anthony Simmons wrote:
> >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> Subject: Re: Tyranny of the Majority
>
> >> How oft
> Mr. Harper wrote in part-
>
> 100 A >> B > C
> 100 C >> B > A
> 1 B > A = C
>
> D- I again suggest a simple YES or NO vote on each choice.
>
> Who, if anybody, in the example could get a YES majority ???
Mr. Harper-
The ">>" corresponds to the divide between YES and NO, in the usual wa
Mr. Simmons wrote-
For this reason, I don't consider it sufficient that the majority have its
way.
D- Either the majority or the minority has its way (since unanimous votes are
few and far between) (pending utopia wherein nobody interferes in the life,
liberty or property of anybody else)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Mr. Harper wrote in part-
>
> 100 A >> B > C
> 100 C >> B > A
> 1 B > A = C
>
> D- I again suggest a simple YES or NO vote on each choice.
>
> Who, if anybody, in the example could get a YES majority ???
The ">>" corresponds to the divide between YES and NO, in
Mr. Harper wrote in part-
I presume your "instability" problem is that, given the existance of a
Sincere Condorcet Winner, if you elect someone who isn't the SCW, then a
majority would prefer to replace the person who you elected with the
SCW. However, a similar phenomenon can happen even if y
