MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> As a practical mattter, I haven't found a need to specify the same
> scenario, but that
> doesn't mean that someone else shouldn't do so. But it seems to me that
> it's universally
> understood in discussions of voting system criteria & examples that
> "outcome" only has
Yes, my more general short definition could be interpreted in a way so that
Borda,
and the pairwise-count methods would fail. It might be an impossible
situation, caused
by the fact that, though what we feel we mean by Monotonicity is
simple--voting someone
higher shouldn't cause him to lose--
In cases where there is no time or technology to do Condorcet head to head
math in legislative bodies one somewhat quicker method is to eliminate a half
(or near half) of the choices at a time.
The combinations just above the dotted lines would be done. *NO choice* (aka
None of the Above -- N
Forest wrote-
Here's an example of an Approval election that could be used to test the
current best efforts at FBC definition (absolute utilities in
parentheses).
45 A($100) B($60) C($20)
30 B($100) C($60) A($20)
25 C($100) A($60) B($20)
---
D- First plus second choices
A 65
B 75
C 55
Votes t
Merrill calls this "adjusted Borda", and attributes it to Black in the
late 50's. Evidently strict ranking is required in plain Borda. In any
event, a voter can always accomplish the same thing either by voting
randomly or by cooperating with another voter.
So in a three-candidate election wit
Forest Simmons wrote:
> When we have time, we should summerize some of the blind alleys and
> partial results so as to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort.
> Perhaps some of the list members could then carry it beyond the point
> where we left off.
At one point I did create a brief summar
Bart:
Where are these Borda rules? I know they are not in the article by Jean Charles
de Borda, which I referred to in my previous message. I also know that Donald
Saari, probably the worlds leading exponent of the BC, says otherwise.
According to Saari it is essential to treat a bullet vote as a
If there is no time to do head to head math, then one quick method is to
repeatedly eliminate a half (even) or near half (odd) of the choices in a
place votes table and shift the place votes up to replace the losers.
Examples-
4 choices
The 2 choices with the most votes in 3rd and 4th place
The answer to David Catchpole's query below would be interesting to me as
well, especially when contemplating Declared Strategy Voting (DSV) methods
along the lines of Lorrie Cranor's thesis.
In this connection note that the following (admittedly non-optimal)
Approval rule of thumb strategy requ
Here's an example of an Approval election that could be used to test the
current best efforts at FBC definition (absolute utilities in
parentheses).
45 A($100) B($60) C($20)
30 B($100) C($60) A($20)
25 C($100) A($60) B($20)
[I attach dollar units to the utilities to emphasize the lack of
altrui
On Mon, 31 Dec 2001, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote in part:
>
> What is the date or the message number for Forest's & Richard's latest
> definition
> of Monotonicity?
>
We never did post to the list on this because we couldn't resolve the
difficulties in a way that was satisfactory to either (much le
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