Re: [EM] Proof Borda Count best in the case of fully ranked preference ballots

Forest: What do you think of circular triplets, such as: A>B>C B>C>A C>A>B, and reversals, such as: A>B>C C>B>A. If that is all the information that we have to go on (when ordinal preference ballots are used, it is ), shouldn't either of these profiles

Re: [EM] Re: Finding the probable best candidate?

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >Mr. LeGrand wrote- > >Who deserves to win the following election? Who wins using Borda? > >11:Browne>Bush>Buchanan>Gore>Nader > 2:Buchanan>Bush>Browne>Nader>Gore > 8:Bush>Browne>Buchanan>Gore>Nader >16:Bush>Buchanan>Browne>Gore>Nader >12:Bush>Buchanan>Browne>Nader>Gore

Re: [EM] Re: Finding the probable best candidate?

Demorep wrote: >Head to Head (Condorcet) Table > >BR Browne BH Bush BN Buchanan G Gore N Nader > >BR BHBN G N > >BR xx 6270 5249 >BH 38 xx98 4949 >BN 30 2xx 4949 >G 48 5151 xx52 >N 51

[EM] Re: Finding the probable best candidate?

Mr. LeGrand wrote- Who deserves to win the following election? Who wins using Borda? 11:Browne>Bush>Buchanan>Gore>Nader 2:Buchanan>Bush>Browne>Nader>Gore 8:Bush>Browne>Buchanan>Gore>Nader 16:Bush>Buchanan>Browne>Gore>Nader 12:Bush>Buchanan>Browne>Nader>Gore 17:Gore>Nader>Browne>Bush>Buchanan

Re: Finding the probable best candidate?

On Mon, 18 Feb 2002, Steve Barney wrote: > Yes, of course we have limited information by which to determine the group's > best candidate, but what if we focus on nothing but the information which is > contained in an ordinal preference ballot? Order of preference isn't sufficient to determine i

Re: [EM] Proof Borda Count best in the case of fully ranked preference ballots

On Mon, 18 Feb 2002, Steve Barney wrote: > > Just so you know, in the case of fully ranked ordinal preference ballots, > Donald Saari has claimed to have proven, mathematically, that the Borda Count > is the optimal procedure in the sense that it produces the smallest number, all > together, o

Re: [EM] Comparing ranked versus unranked methods

On Tue, 19 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote: > The problem with Webster and PAV is not its fairness in allocation, which > is arguably impeccable in the ideal, but rather its manipulability as > compared to d'Hondt. Since d'Hondt has a (very slight) bias toward larger > parties, it eliminates the in

[EM] A proposition to end apathy, if anyone cares

Hi California citizens, The instructions that came with this article stated that I was to forward it to California people, so be it. I forward it to you, people who live in California, the land of fruits and nuts. My duty is done. Ha Ha Donald - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -