26 AB
25 BA
49 CX
100
Who wins (with or without insincere /strategic votes) ??? OR -- the
mysterious case of solving for X (= A and/or B, anywhere from zero to 49)
Any answers from Mr. LeGrand or Mr. Ossipoff ???
Mr. Schulze wrote-
every election method that meets the majority criterion is
vulnerable to "compromising". In so far as a voter will
usually approve at least that candidate who gets this
voter's first preference, you cannot circumvent this
incompability by using "some hybrid method that requires
On Thu, 28 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Forest,
>
> every election method that meets the majority criterion is
> vulnerable to "compromising". In so far as a voter will
> usually approve at least that candidate who gets this
> voter's first preference, you cannot circumvent this
> incom
02/28/02 - Successive Quota Surpluses for STV and IRVing:
Dear Tom Ruen,
Back on the 26th of January, when I answered your post about `vote
splitting', there was another solution that I had forgotten about. That
solution goes by the title of: Successive Quota Surpluses for STV.
The method uses
Rob LG said:
try Simpson (Plain Condorcet) and Schulze
(SSD).
I reply:
So Rob LG believes that Schulze's method is SSD?
BeatpathWinner is equivalent to Cloneproof SSD.
Cloneproof SSD is a modification of SSD. SSD never meant
Cloneproof SSD. And Schulze's method isn't BeatpathWinner anyway.
Dear Forest,
every election method that meets the majority criterion is
vulnerable to "compromising". In so far as a voter will
usually approve at least that candidate who gets this
voter's first preference, you cannot circumvent this
incompability by using "some hybrid method that requires
infor
Rob LeGrand said:
Now Mike Ossipoff wants to discourage strategic truncation
I reply:
That wasn't what I said. I said that I'd like to keep truncation
(strategic or otherwise) from
causing the defeat of a sincere CW in violation of majority rule. And I'd
like voters to
not have to use dras
