[EM] An alternative to Tideman

Yesterday, when I said that, having estimated the 2 top votegetters, and their probabilities of outpolling eachother, one could then estimate their win probabilities. But if that's done based on those other estimates named here, that can lead to mutually contradictory estimates, and that suggest

Re: [EM] election-utility strategy

Forest Simmons wrote: > What if the polls could tell us (for each i and j) what percentage of the > voters approve both candidates i and j. If that percentage is not close > to the product of the percentages of approval for i and approval for j, it > would tell us that that approval for i and j a

Re: [EM] election-utility strategy

On Sat, 27 Apr 2002, Richard Moore wrote: > > I think in non-zero-info cases, if the inference is based on each > candidate's probable vote totals and margin of error from a reliable > Approval-style poll, then the inference is supported by statistical > evidence, [etc.] This brings up the qu

[EM] RE: Gerrymander story- Economist

Alex wrote in part -- I wonder when they'll be able to say "Alex is in apartment 22 and registered with this party, and the guy in apt. 21 is a different party, so let's draw the line between those units." --- D- Welcome to the cynical world of minority rule gerrymanders. At least the gerryman

Re: The Allure of IRV

I agree with Mike's main point (that we should go after the public, and not worry too much about converting IRV proponents) as well as his secondary important point that rank balloting is not the right thing to take to the public at this point. By keeping things simple we can use simplicity as an

Re: [EM] Doubts on Approval Strategy

Rob Lanphier wrote: > Let's assume a simple left-right spectrum, with candidates A, B, C, and D > (far left to far right). Let's also say that candidates B wins in a world > where there's accurate data, and everyone votes according to expected > strategy (where "B" and "C" are the only candidates

[EM] 2002 U.S.A. campaign finance law cases

http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance/ has th various 2002 U.S.A. campaign finance law cases. How many pounds (tons ???) of paper in all cases ??? I continue to note the indirect minority rule math of the ANTI-Democracy gerrymander/ plurality regime in the U.S.A. Congress that en

[EM] Ventura

Demorep- I agree that MN should have used a different election method, so that whoever their governor might be he can claim more than 37%% support. However, calling Ventura's election a "subversion of democracy" seems to imply that he shouldn't have taken office. If somebody fails to get a major

RE: [EM] Gerrymander story- Economist

I wonder when they'll be able to say "Alex is in apartment 22 and registered with this party, and the guy in apt. 21 is a different party, so let's draw the line between those units." Even better "This husband and wife are opposite parties. Since he sleeps on the left side of the bed and has his

RE: Bounded AV

Mr. Hager wrote in part- With the Venetian system, set it up so that a failure of any candidate to get at least 66% means that all candidates are rejected and a new election with new candidates must be held. --- D- Democracy = 50 % plus 1 ANTI- Democracy = less than 50 % plus 1 Super-Democrac

Re: [EM] Doubts on Approval Strategy

Rob L wrote: >Let's assume a simple left-right spectrum, with candidates A, B, C, and D >(far left to far right). Let's also say that candidates B wins in a world >where there's accurate data, and everyone votes according to expected >strategy (where "B" and "C" are the only candidates who get o

RE: [EM] Gerrymander story- Economist

What a great link, thanks. 98% re-election? North Korea would be proud? BLAH! -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2002 11:56 AM Subject: [EM] Gerrymander story- Economist The Economist, a U.K. politics magazine, has a story

Re: [EM] Bounded AV

I recently read something about elections in Venice. I think it was in this PDF file, which I found when I wasd looking for information on Ramón Llull (or Lull) who invented Condorcet voting in the 13th century. Voting in Medieval Universities and Religious Orders http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/mc

[EM] Doubts on Approval Strategy

Hi all, I've been somewhat following the various "approval strategy" threads, and I'm still a little skeptical. In addition to the three-way problem that Richard Moore points out, I think a more troubling problem will be in getting good polling data. When asked in some NYTimes/ABC/Disney/WorldC