Steph wrote:
I do not hate Middle, I just dislike under and over representation
when it comes from the system...
In a sense every voting system's result comes from "the system".
But when, with Approval, the voters keep to the voter median,
that also comes from expressed wishes of a majority of t
pauldubourt said:
> I agree with Donald that single-seat cumulative
> voting is preferable to approval voting, because it seems as if some
> voters have more influence over the election than other voters in the
> approval voting system.
Go to the election methods mailing list and you'll find there
On Wed, 15 Jan 2003, Alex Small wrote:
> I'm not convinced
> that symmetry is a particularly compelling reason to pick an election
> method,
especially not the symmetry of {ABC,BCA,CAB}, which has a rotational bias.
True, it favors no candidate, but it does favor its three orders ove
Forest Simmons said:
> So here's a new method (for three candidate races only): first remove
> all of the symmetry, and then the candidate with a majority of first
> place votes (on the remaining ballots) is the winner.
The order in which one removes symmetry matters. Canceling out reversal
symme
Which, although too much to digest in a single read-through, perfectly
segues into a crazy idea I had the other day.
Game Theory is a geometry, someone told me.
The difficult part of voting math is often the cyclical nature of certain
results (A>B B>C C>A) (anyone who reads this list can come to
Actually, Cantor proved that there are infinitely many distinct infinities
on the same day he proved that the cardinality of the reals is greater
than the cardinality of the rationals.
Here's the proof in modern notation:
Let X be any set (finite or infinite, it doesn't matter). Let P(X) be the
One could limit the space to so many ASCII symbols, so the person most
ingenious at describing large numbers would choose the winner.
That's far to easy. Every candidate would be in a tie as one would
only need to write out the symbol for infinity, while not a number
itself, it is a perfect des
One could limit the space to so many ASCII symbols, so the person most
ingenious at describing large numbers would choose the winner.
Say there are ten symbols allowed, which would be larger
9!
or
9^9^9^9^9! ?
If there were enough symbols to write out the phrase
"The sum of all the o
I've already given an example in which Borda gives the wrong answer after
the symmetry is removed. Now you have given an example in which symmetry
removal shows the CW to be wrong. So that evens the score :-)
In other words, neither Borda nor Condorcet can claim to be superior on
the basis of sym
Suppose each voter is to mark one candidate and write down one number in
the space provided on the ballot, and that the winner of the election is
the candidate marked on the ballot that has the largest number in the
space provided.
I just just see this turning into a contest of stamina as the obv
I cannot do better, but here is a consideration:
Suppose each voter is to mark one candidate and write down one number in
the space provided on the ballot, and that the winner of the election is
the candidate marked on the ballot that has the largest number in the
space provided.
Does this method
Steph wrote:
Suppose two sets, S1 the set of voters and S2 the set of candidates.
Suppose an electoral method that produces scores for each candidate.
If you can split S1 in |S2| subsets each of a cardinality equal to the score
obtained
by the corresponding candidate, you can link these two sets
I do not hate Middle, I just dislike under and over representation
when it comes from the system...
As for a complete mathematical and thorough definition of
reciprocal fairness, try this.
Suppose two sets, S1 the set of voters and S2 the set of candidates.
Suppose an electoral method that produc
Dear participants,
Mike Ossipoff wrote (15 Jan 2003):
> RP can choose a winner that isn't a member of the initial
> Schwartz set, and that's somewhat unaesthetic.
Ranked Pairs cannot choose decisively a candidate who isn't in
the Schwartz set. Whether a candidate who isn't in the Schwartz
set can
01/15/03 - James' reply to my `Northern Ireland Assembly' Letter:
Dear James and list members,
James, you wrote: "You may not be advocating "one area elections", but you
are quite clearly advocating two other features of voting systems that have
profound political effects, ie "near 100% party pro
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