Dear participants,
Marquette is mentioned three times in Proportional Representation
(MacMillan Company, New York, 1926) by Clarence Gilbert Hoag and
George Hervey Hallett.
Page 7:
A third majority preferential system, invented by Professor
E.J. Nanson of Melbourne, has been used for public
Markus:
I did just that in Marquette, MI, a couple summers ago, and can confirm that
they did, in fact, use Nanson's method in the 20s. I don't know about the
other Marquette (Marquette, WI). (Actually, the public library wasn't of much
help. The best sources were the City Clerk and the local
Markus:
I did just that in Marquette, MI, a couple summers ago, and can confirm that
they did, in fact, use Nanson's method in the 20s. I don't know about the
other Marquette (Marquette, WI). (Actually, the public library wasn't of much
help. The best sources were the City Clerk and the local
Someone posted it once.
The Israeli election are over. Sharon has cleaned up. Was wondering what
kind of system they use that elects the Butcher of Sabra to Prime Minister
It's probably the Fuck It, I never liked this god damned planet anyway
Sharon Election == Guaranteed Israeli involvement
Steve Barney said:
BTW, one reason given in a news article for dropping Nanson's Method and
reverting back to the plurality with a runoff was that they preferred
voting twice, and felt that they could be more informed voters the
second time around. What to do about that?
It's tempting to
On Wed, 29 Jan 2003, Steve Barney wrote:
...
BTW, one reason given in a news article for dropping Nanson's Method and
reverting back to the plurality with a runoff was that they preferred voting
twice, and felt that they could be more informed voters the second time
around. What to do about
At long last, the proof that satisfying strong FBC requires a method
equivalent to Top 2 Voting when we have 3 candidates. The proof is
lengthy, but here it is. At the end I mention problems with generalizing
to 4 or more candidates, and also opine that top 2 voting is Approval
Voting if we
Good work, Alex. I think the argument can be simplified so that
it will generalize easier, but nobody else has faced up to it like you
have.
BTW it seems like every N+3 candidate election has a three candidate
election embedded within it as far as each faction is concerned, since
each faction
Forest Simmons said:
BTW it seems like every N+3 candidate election has a three candidate
election embedded within it as far as each faction is concerned, since
each faction has its Favorite, along with the two front runners to worry
about.
I have an idea for generalizing: add the Pareto
Alex Small said:
I think the Partial Decisiveness condition removes the possibility of
fractal boundaries, since I specified that the ties occur on a set of 5
dimensions (or N!-1 dimensions for N candidate races).
I should have said a set of 4 dimensions, not 5. The set of all possible
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