[EM] Hello (Intro); PR, Condorcet and Approval, variants...

2003-02-18 Thread Venzke Kevin
Hello. I've been reading lots of messages on this list for a week or so, and I decided it would be good to join it. I can ask questions even if my own ideas are not generally interesting. I've always been interested in organization of government (esp. comparative), but I've only recently become

[EM] Final reply to Tom McIntyre

2003-02-18 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Adam Tarr wrote: Tom McIntyre Wrote: MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: 101: A 50: BAC 100: CBA About 60% of the voters have indicated that they'd rather elect B than A. And so margins elects A. WV counts, keeps, & honors the B>A majority. A has a majority defeat that wv doesn't lose or erase. With m

Re: Blake's margins arguments

2003-02-18 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
I'd said: 101: A 50: BAC 100: CBA About 60% of the voters have indicated that they'd rather elect B than A. And so margins elects A. WV counts, keeps, & honors the B>A majority. A has a majority defeat that wv doesn't lose or erase. With margins, what happens to that majority against A? Ma

Re: [EM] Saari's Basic Argument

2003-02-18 Thread Steve Barney
Here is a simpler example to illustrate the difference that the order in which cyclic and reversal terms are canceled does not matter when using the strictly correct method - as opposed to the method used by Forest Simmons and Alex Small, and in some of Saari's popular expositions where he is me

Re: [EM] Strong FBC

2003-02-18 Thread Alex Small
Forest Simmons said: > It seems to me that any neutral method that gives a three way tie to a > reverse order pair (like the following ballot pair) cannot satisfy both > Pareto and the strong FBC: > > 1 A>B>C > 1 C>B>A . > > Here's my reasoning. Suppose that there are only two voters and one has >

Re: [EM] Blake's margins arguments - CORRECTION

2003-02-18 Thread AVnow
I wrote: Let's take another example: 101: A 1: BAC 101: CBA In this case, B defeats A 102>101, A defeats C 102>101, and C defeats B 101>1 (with 101 abstaining). B>A and A>C are victories by majority, but very weak victories. C>B is a non-majority win, but a resounding victory. Just to ge

Re: [EM] Blake's margins arguments

2003-02-18 Thread AVnow
Adam Tarr wrote: Tom McIntyre Wrote: MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: 101: A 50: BAC 100: CBA About 60% of the voters have indicated that they'd rather elect B than A. And so margins elects A. WV counts, keeps, & honors the B>A majority. A has a majority defeat that wv doesn't lose or erase. With marg

RE: [EM] election-methods-list moving

2003-02-18 Thread Narins, Josh
I see only the list when I reply-to-all. More often than not my primitive input to this list really only merits a comment to the post author, and not to the list itself. Take, for example, this post :) > -Original Message- > From: Adam Tarr [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Sunday, Feb

Re: [EM] Blake's margins arguments

2003-02-18 Thread Adam Tarr
Tom McIntyre Wrote: 101: A 50: BAC 100: CBA About 60% of the voters have indicated that they'd rather elect B than A. And so margins elects A. WV counts, keeps, & honors the B>A majority. A has a majority defeat that wv doesn't lose or erase. With margins, what happens to that majority agains

Re: [EM] Blake's margins arguments

2003-02-18 Thread AVnow
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: 101: A 50: BAC 100: CBA About 60% of the voters have indicated that they'd rather elect B than A. And so margins elects A. WV counts, keeps, & honors the B>A majority. A has a majority defeat that wv doesn't lose or erase. With margins, what happens to that majority agai

[EM] Blake's margins arguments

2003-02-18 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Blake has recently recommended his margins arguments to us, and so for that reason I'd like to reply to them here. I realize that all of these arguments have already been replied to here more than once. Because Blake's arguments are very long, I'd like to copy part of my reply to the beginnin