Hi all,
I'm interested in election systems (I was briefly on this list before being
deluged with mail, and still read it sometimes via the archives). I'm also a
volunteer editor with Wikipedia ( http://www.wikipedia.org/ ), a free
encyclopedia that is collaboratively-edited by volunteers from
It occurs to me that on any stage of evaluation, more
than one candidate could have a "majority." That
makes it seem a little arbitrary to have to say, "If
someone has a majority *and* it's the largest
majority, stop processing." Also, since the
majorities could overlap, it is more obviously
art
Something I've been wondering about... has anyone suggested extending the
gradation in MCA beyond preferred, approved, and diapproved? For example,
why not use MCA with a A,B,C,D,F ballot? If no candidate has a majority of
A's, then check for a majority of A's and B's, then check for a majorit
--- Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> Equal rankings are permitted. In that sense it is
> different from Bucklin.
> You can rate two candidates as Preferred rather
> than one, so it passes
> the weak FBC. You can rate one candidate as
> Preferred and all others as
> unacceptable, so
Venzke Kevin said:
> Can someone tell me how this differs from Bucklin
> (with two rankings permitted)? It seems similar to
> me, but doesn't Bucklin suffer from severe strategy
> problems?
Equal rankings are permitted. In that sense it is different from Bucklin.
You can rate two candidates as
--- Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
Majority Choice Approval is also attractive. I
> haven't heard too many
> objections on this list.
>
>
Hello. I went back and looked for a definition of
"MCA" on Yahoo Groups archives, and this is the
understanding I managed. It might be wrong:
Stephane,
Here are a couple responses to your last reply.
There's a lot I didn't specifically reply to, but
that's because I'm lacking comments for it. I don't
think I can be convinced for PR again, but I'm also
not sure what Canada should do.
> purpose. It is mathematically incoherent to split
Douglas Greene said:
> I'm all for approval. But, we do have to concede that people like the
> expressivity of rank ordering (even if, as in IRV, it has negative
> consequences).
>
> So . . why do we think approval is superior to range (aka cardinal
> rankings) as a public proposal?
I think most
--- James Gilmour <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a
écrit : > > Kevin wrote (in part)
> >
> > Is it wise to permit independent candidates to
> run?
>
> Why would you want to put artificial constraints on
> democratic representation?
I don't really. I should've asked, "Is it wise to run
as an individual can
> With wv as presented in this mail group, the voted
> disliked candidates are ranked ahead of "unknown"
> (nonvoted) candidates. Thus the risk that a..
Yes, I can see that. But I didn't mean my concern in
the context of the wv/margins dispute. I think people
*would* rank unknown candidates
-- Original Message --
From: Venzke Kevin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 08:59:54 +0100 (CET)
>I'm now more taken with Approval and Condorcet after
>reading about them. I want the elected candidate to
>have the broa
-- Original Message --
From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2003 12:37:05 -0800 (PST)
>In summary, there are cases in which I would prefer sincere margins over
>sincere winning votes, for example 50 to 1 ov
The following is an update from the CVD. As we start to evolve into an action group
(for those who want to join me in that route), we need to get more organized around
their efforts. I'm actively monitoring NY, but I can't cover the whole country. MN,
VT and FL are top states to keep an eye o
On Tue, 2003-02-18 at 00:22, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Blake has recently recommended his margins arguments to us, and so
> for that reason I'd like to reply to them here. I realize that all of
> these arguments have already been replied to here more than once.
>
> Because Blake's arguments are very
Mike --
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/10742
As for a complete mathematical and thorough definition of
> reciprocal fairness, try this.
>
> Suppose two sets, S1 the set of voters and S2 the set of candidates.
I think margin is the more natural criteria.
I think relative margin is the best criteria to represent the people's
will.
I think winning votes is the best criteria to provide sincere rankings.
I have yet no way to compare their relative quality,
so actually I can live with any of these. Just tell
James said:
The whole point about STV-PR is
that, uniquely among PR systems, it allows the electors to vote for all the
candidates as individuals. So it is the voters who decide which candidates take
the seats.
The point of allowing the electors to vote for all the candidates as individuals
Hello Kevin, so soon...
Ok, I take a break from the General Estates of Quebec
(It is this week-end)...
It looks to me like within a district, the game is IRV
except that voters may refuse to transfer their vote
after a certain point.
It could be said like that, but it seems to me like plain
Alex Small wrote:
>
> Keep this in mind about selling the public on winning votes or margins:
> Nobody says "Bush won Florida with ", they say "Bush won
> Florida by 537 votes" or whatever the final margin was. (I say Bush won
> Florida 5-4 with 50% of the female vote, 100% of the African Americ
Rob LeGrand wrote:
In fact, winning-votes often
encourages *more* drastic strategy: If A>B>C is sincere and voting A=B>C
helps the voter under margins, winning-votes could make that strategy
ineffective, forcing a more drastically strategic B>A>C vote.
Really? I have found in examples that I
Alex wrote:
> Before we sell the public on Condorcet we need to get ourselves heard
> over the cacaphony of pro-IRV voices. Seen in that light, the new
> Approval Voting organization seems like a much better horse to back in
> any race.
Obviously, I couldn't agree more. :-) Thanks so much to al
> Kevin wrote (in part)
>
> Is it wise to permit independent candidates to run?
Why would you want to put artificial constraints on democratic representation?
> I still don't think STV (etc.) can improve PR. To run
> on the party list, candidates will need to conform to
> their parties. They w
Rob LeGrand said:
> Forest wrote:
>> This leads to another question:
>>
>> Are voters more apt to vote sincerely if they know the winner will be
>> determined according to the rules of margins or to the rules of
>> winning votes?
>
> This is certainly an important question to ask.
As a practical m
Forest wrote:
> This leads to another question:
>
> Are voters more apt to vote sincerely if they know the winner will be
> determined according to the rules of margins or to the rules of winning
> votes?
This is certainly an important question to ask. But I believe that one of
Blake's most impor
Suppose for the sake of argument that Blake is right in his (as I
understand it) main reason for preferring margins over winning votes:
Margins are better estimators than sheer numbers for deciding which
candidate is likely to do the best job.
Let's assume this is true if the margins are sincere.
Stephane,
Ok, I made an attempt to read it. I'm not totally
certain how your system works, but I have a comment or
two.
First, I don't quite understand the goal of the math.
It looks to me like within a district, the game is IRV
except that voters may refuse to transfer their vote
after a certa
I want to add something else to my argument:
For normative reasons I consider the Borda Count to be an unsatisfactory
election method. I have certain behavioral, strategic, and political
criteria that Borda fails miserably (no method is perfect, but Borda gets
a flat F while some methods gets C's
Steve Barney said:
> IF YOU DO THE DECOMPOSITION WITH THESE
> MATRIXES, IT DOES NOT MATTER IF YOU FIND THE REVERSAL TERMS OR THE
> CONDORCET (CYCLIC) TERMS FIRST.
That approach gives us profiles where -12 voters or whatever have a given
preference order. It is undoubtedly a mathematical fact tha
Venzke, I invite you to read:
http://www.fairvotecanada.org/phpBB/viewtopic.php?topic=8&forum=1&4
It is a STV variant defined on a national instead of regional basis, and
that uses a mix of alternative vote and residual approbation to produce an
exactly
proportional result instead of vote transfer
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