order
to change the outcome under the first method.
-- Hugh Tobin
rs could vote for "any write-in" over both of them, and a
candidate whose name is known only to a handful of voters could be the
Condorcet winner. If, as Demorep fears, the race is between Hitler and
Stalin, and if the position must be filled, then this option seems to
have some merit.
-- Hugh Tobin
quot;feelings," rather than on crude rankings, then please
propose such a system, structured so that each voter would have the
incentive accurately to report the intensity of those "feelings", rather
than to exaggerate them so as to maximize the chances of his or her most
favored candidate.
-- Hugh Tobin
Markus Schulze wrote:
>
> Dear Hugh Tobin,
>
> I cannot agree with your statement, that (if a Condorcet Criterion
> method is used) only omnissent voters can vote strategically.
>
I did not make the statement attributed to me. I did, I believe, show
that rational strategi
of this type of a "guarantee" to the point of
acting against his own interest?
In instant run-off, there is no guarantee that casting a first-place
vote for one's first choice, instead of one's last choice, will not
cause the first choice candidate to lose. So nobody would vote
I have received a notice from the King County, Washington Charter Review
Commission soliciting public input into a charter reform process. Is
anyone else proposing election methods reform here? If not, I would
like to submit a proposal for use of Smith//Condorcet in single-winner
elections. (Oth
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Hugh Tobin writes:
[snip]
> >
> > Finally, let me suggest that making Steve's second example a litmus test
> > (even with the reasonable exception), and implying that a "Condorcet"
> > system would not elect A (despite his lar
m rather than
to divide over how to deal with short ballots in the tiebreak.
-- Hugh Tobin
ed strategy, figuring
the likelihood that enough others will do so to elect Chisholm is
remote.
But a coordinated strategy involving a select list of voters who will
respond to a signal from the plurality candidate's team on election day
is the most likely scenario. Remember, Buchanan is still with us.
-- Hugh Tobin
deterrent strategy if its announcement had produced the intended effect
on B voters. I think the M voter is in a tough spot here, but agree
with Mike that this rather special case is a minor problem compared to
tactical opportunities in IRO. Examples have been discussed previously,
but time permitting I'll post one again.
-- Hugh Tobin
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