Quoting Blake from below:
>
> But for reasonable people, the objective proof of a method passing a
> criterion has to be supplemented by an argument for why they should
> care. So, the question is, if you want to make a Condorcet-based
> argument against plurality, is this simplified by the
At 06:39 PM 1/30/02 -0800, Blake Cretney wrote:
>Your definition may well be clear and easy to apply. I don't remember
>your definition.
I'm pretty sure this is Mike's Definition:
http://electionmethods.org/evaluation.html#CC
It seems like a reasonable one to me. This does not mean that we
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> Blake continues:
>
> Another solution to the problem would be to redefine CC to involve the
> idea of voting sincerely. Presumably, sincere votes in a Condorcet
> completion method should result in the sincere Condorcet winner winning.
> But they would not in plurality.
Blake wrote:
[...]
Another way out is to redefine plurality so that it applies to ranked
ballots. The winner is the candidate who gets the most first-place
votes. Now, plurality fails. I suspect that this is the approach most
academics would take. However, it clearly involves a redefinition
