Here's a simple example that I hope will be of interest to those who
believe that there can be valid distinctions in levels of approval:
Utilities: 3 210
--
Faction 1: AB C
Faction 2: CB A
Assume zero information from polls,
Craig, thanks for the critique.
I mentioned in one posting that I owed Joe W., Bart I., and Martin H. for
certain insights that led to the need for (and certain features of) a
finer resolution dyadic system.
I also owe you for your excellent example with utilities and poll results
that showed
Thanks to Martin Harper and Craig Layton for valuable critiques.
In particular, Martin is right. The voters should be able to make
distinctions among their unapproved candidates, too.
Here's a more ideal version of a compromise between Condorcet and
Approval, which could be considered a dyadic
One other thing. In a zero information election, start by expressing your
utilities in binary rounded to three binary digits, this takes you
directly to the second representation of the dyadic refined approval
ballot below, bypassing the strategic , , and boundary
calculations.
Forest
On
For this zero information direct utility conversion to work best, all
utilities should be between zero and .99, and after the conversion to
binary, truncate to three binary digits (instead of rounding).
It's hard to say whether this method is more in the spirit of Approval or
the spirit of
If you solve circular ties by Approval, where candidates whom you've
ranked get an Approval vote from you, then you have to worry about
strategy, how far to extend you ranking, even if there's no danger
of anyone using offensive order-reversal strategy. With Condorcet,
in the form of PC,
I have ambiguous feelings about my two favorite methods.
Sometimes it seems like Condorcet is over-elaborate, making fine
distinctions between the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic. (How's that
for a mixed metaphor?)
On the other hand, there are times when Approval strategy leaves me in a
Forest Simmons wrote:
I have ambiguous feelings about my two favorite methods.
Sometimes it seems like Condorcet is over-elaborate, making fine
distinctions between the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic. (How's that
for a mixed metaphor?)
On the other hand, there are times when
Forest Simmons wrote:
I have a couple of suggested compromises starting with Condorcet and
moving towards Approval, but stopping short of ordinary Approval.
Looking at just the first for now...
I. Condorcet. I prefer the version of Condorcet that allows voters to
give a partial preference
Joe wrote (in relation to Forest's Condorcet//Approval compromise):
I like it - was considering the same thing myself (Smith//Approval, I
guess it'd be called). If there's only strategy in Condorcet methods if
there's a tie, then it'd make sense to resolve the tie using methods
which have
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