At 21:16 +0200 26.1.2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
>> I'm not sure if this is very interesting. This year's Eurovision Song
>> Contest is approaching
...
>For clarification, are there exactly 11 or 12 nominees? Or is there a
>much larger pool of candidates, from which each country is free to
>select i
There are about 25-30 nominees. That makes it more like hybrid of Approval
and Borda voting. You mentioned strategic voting - there is a large
possibility of strategic voting since countries do not give the votes at the
same time. They call to the TV show one by one and give their votes. So for
ex
For clarification, are there exactly 11 or 12 nominees? Or is there a
much larger pool of candidates, from which each country is free to
select its top 11 choices?
If the former, the system sounds very close to Borda. I don't think the
lack of an 11 point tier makes much difference. If the la
st <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Interesting use of Borda count
>
[...]
>
> I tried to get Portland Community College (Portland, Oregon, where I
> teach) to adopt this text or a similar one for the liberal arts math
> course. Instead they opted for teaching standard top
On Wed, 23 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
>
> There are quite a few liberal arts math textbooks which include chapters on
> Arrow's Theorem and alternative voting methods, weighted voting and
> proportional representation. For example, the first 4 chapters, which make up
> the first section of
Bart:
There are quite a few liberal arts math textbooks which include chapters on
Arrow's Theorem and alternative voting methods, weighted voting and
proportional representation. For example, the first 4 chapters, which make up
the first section of Tannenbaum and Arnold's _Excursions in Modern
Ma
Of course. Isn't it ironic that most multi-seat local elections, at
least in California, use something similar to approval voting, while the
single-vote plurality used in single seat elections is logically
equivalent to cumulative voting.
Bart
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> I assume that you are
I assume that you are not advocating cumulative voting for single winner
elections, but are saying that Tom's idea might be a good way to get
proportional representation in multi-winner elections.
Forest
On Sat, 5 Jan 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
>
>
> Forest Simmons wrote:
> >
> > Bart,
> >
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Bart,
>
> this discussion reminds me of the time Tom Ruen was toying with the idea
> of modifying Approval by requiring all of the approved candidates on one
> ballot to share one vote equally, i.e. if you approve three candidates
> they each get one third of your vot
Bart,
this discussion reminds me of the time Tom Ruen was toying with the idea
of modifying Approval by requiring all of the approved candidates on one
ballot to share one vote equally, i.e. if you approve three candidates
they each get one third of your vote, a kind of constrained cumulative
vot
I don't recall using the term "average ranking". My focus was on
average (or total) point counts (i.e. Borda scores), as a way of showing
the practical and strategic equivalence among the Borda variations
mentioned.
Steve Barney wrote:
>
> Bart:
>
> OK, I get it now. When I see the term "av
Bart:
OK, I get it now. When I see the term "average ranking" I think of something
other than what you describe. I think you get a more intuitive, and perhaps
more descriptive sense of "average ranking" if you do as follows. You average
the RANKINGS for each candidate by dividing the sum of the r
ine in PDF
> format - see table 2.2 in the bottom half of page 4:
>
> "EXPLAINING ALL THREE-ALTERNATIVE VOTING OUTCOMES," DONALD G. SAARI
> http://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
>
> Steve Barney
>
> > Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2002 21:02:21
able 2.2 in the bottom half of page 4:
"EXPLAINING ALL THREE-ALTERNATIVE VOTING OUTCOMES," DONALD G. SAARI
http://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
Steve Barney
> Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2002 21:02:21 -0800
> From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
27;s BC election tally is the sum of her pairwise
> tallies. (See Saari, _Basic Geometry of Voting, Springer-Verlag, 1995
> "EXPLAINING ALL THREE-ALTERNATIVE VOTING OUTCOMES," DONALD G. SAARI
> http://www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/triple.pdf
>
> > Date: Tue, 01 Jan 2002 15
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [EM] Interesting use of Borda count
>
> I wonder if Bennett's ballot was counted per Borda rules -- i.e.
> Bennetts's first choice receiving 10 points, the remaining nine
> receiving 5 points each.
>
> If this were a public elec
I wonder if Bennett's ballot was counted per Borda rules -- i.e.
Bennetts's first choice receiving 10 points, the remaining nine
receiving 5 points each.
If this were a public election held in Florida, Bennett's candidate
would have contested the election, claiming that either the election
meth
Interesting use of Borda count. Note that one voter insisted
on interpreting it as CR. (There was obviously no strategic
reason to vote the way she did.)
>> Terrorist attacks top news story in AP poll
>> SURVEY: Journalists put Afghan war in No. 2 spot
>> David Crary; The Associated Press
>
18 matches
Mail list logo
