- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 03/18/01 Greetings, I was looking over these pages out of Robert's Rules of Order that Steve Barney was so kind to send to us, when I seen something I didn't like. The point of this letter is to object to some tie solutions that are presented in Robert's Rules and to offer a better solution for these ties that can occur in Preferential Voting aka Instant Runoff Voting aka Irving. One of Robert's tie solutions deals with the case in which two or more candidates are tied at the bottom. The second tie solution deals with the case in which two or more candidates are tied in the winning position, that is, when the field of candidates has been reduced down to only the tied candidates. Below is the text of those two tie solutions from Robert's Rules of Order: [First Tie Solution:] "If at any point two or more candidates or propositions are tied for the least popular position, the ballots in their piles are redistributed in a single step, all of the tied names being treated as eliminated." [Second Tie Solution:] "In the event of a tie in the winning position--which would imply that the elimination process is continued until the ballots are reduced to two or more equal piles--the election should be resolved in favor of the candidate or proposition that was strongest in terms of first choices (by referring to the record of the first distribution)." I claim that both of these tie solutions are unacceptable and that we should not include them in any Irving proposals. A better solution will be offered lower in this letter, but first a few words about Robert's tie solutions. After reading the first tie solution, you should have realized that the solution is to merely eliminate all candidates that are tied at the lowest level. This would be acceptable if the tied candidates have a vote total between them less than the votes of the one candidate ahead of them, if not then this solution is not acceptable. If there were a one vote difference between two lowest candidates, we would eliminate the lowest, transfer his votes and the other candidate would go on to compete with the rest of the remaining candidates. While there is no one vote difference if the two lowest are tied, the solution should still result in only one candidate being eliminated and the other candidate going on to compete with the rest of the remaining candidates. The solution should not be as drastic as eliminating all tied candidates. Those people at Robert's Rules of Order are the type of people I meant when I wrote: "It's a shame when peole, who have studied mathematics, have no mathematical sense of right or wrong." Of course, I am assuming that they do have someone among them that has studied mathematics - not always good to assume, maybe they should ask the sweeper to look over the text before they publish their next Newly Revised Edition. Suppose we had a tie between the two lowest candidates in a three candidate race. And these two lowest candidates also had together a majority of the votes. To declare the lead candidate the winner would be the same as going by the rules of Plurality. This is not a Plurality election, it is a Irving election, we are trying to get away from Plurality, we should not use Plurality to solve our ties in Irving elections. Tell me, who should win this election? 40 Ax, 30 Bx, 30 Cx Plurality Rules will have candidate `A' being the winner. Robert's Rules will also have candidate `A' being the winner. There is a better solution, but first a word about Robert's second tie solution. The second Robert's tie solution also uses Plurality as a solution. The words, "...strongest in term of first choices" is the same as saying the leading candidate is to be elected, which is the Plurality Rule. Who wins the following election? First choices: 40 Ax, 30 Bx, 20 Cx, 10 Dx After cycles of Irving: 49 Ax, 49 Bx Plurality Rules will have `A' being the winner. Robert's Rules will also have `A' being the winner, and for the same reason as Plurality Rules, because `A' is the leading candidate of the first choices. Again, I say we should not use Plurality to solve ties in our Irving elections. Tossing a coin would be a better and a less evil solution than using Robert's Rules. We advocate the use of ranked choices, we should also use these ranked choices to solve any ties. The Better Solution - Next Lower Choices: There is a solution that is better than Robert's Rules, better than tossing a coin. The tie solution that should be used involves using the Next Lower Choices. We do this by conducting a special tally of the next choices of the current votes of only the two or more tied candidates. We run this special tally on the side because we are only trying to determine which candidate to drop. We deal only with the current votes of only the tied candidates. Whichever of the tied candidates has the lowest number of next choices is the candidate that is dropped. What we are doing when we go to the next choices is that we are examining two possible cases at once. Case one: What would be the next vote tally for these tied candidates if one of them is dropped? Case two: What would be the vote tally if instead the other candidate is dropped? Whichever one of the tied candidates ends up with the lowest vote tally, that is the candidate that is dropped. If they are still tied we must go to the second next choice on the ballots of these tied candidates and seek a difference. If they are still tied after we exhaust all levels of choices then we go back to the next choices of all the candidates and use those choices. I prefer to have the tie solved in the choices of the votes of only the candidates that are tied but if that does not break the tie then the next step is to use the next choices of all the candidates. It is still a level playing field for the tied candidates because each has the same mathematical chance of getting the same number of choices in the next stage. I am trying to drop only one of these tied candidates at this place in the tallying of the ballots. We have a number of stages in which we can break a tie - the tie most likely will be broken. Ties must be covered because if there is a tie it will be important that it be handled correctly. There is a criticism of using the next lower choices to solve a tie. It is possible for your next choice to help defeat your current top choice. You can consider this to be a slight possibility, because in order for this to happen to you, four conditions must occur at the same time: One: There must be a tie, which is a rarity and the rarity increases as the elections become larger. Two: Your current top choice must be one of the tied candidates. Three: Your next choice must be the other tied candidate. Four: Your top choice must lose the tie contest. It will be rare for all of these conditions to happen to you at one time, but they will happen to someone in the event of a tie. If these conditions do pile up on you and you become one of these someones, your next choice will go on to compete with the rest of the candidates, but compare this to what happens when we use Robert's Rules, both your current top choice and your next choice will be eliminated, neither will go on to compete with anyone. This Next Lower Choices solution has this slight downside of your next lower choice helping to defeat your current top choice. I accept this downside because it will be a very small downside compared to having both of my choices eliminated. After all, which is worst, having one choice causing another choice to be elimiated or having both choices being eliminated? Having your candidate involved in a tie will be rare. Add to that the odds against your next choice being the other candidate in the tie, it becomes something that may never happen to you, and if it does happen to you, it'll be best to keep one of your top two choices still in the game. This solution can also be used if the tied candidates are in the winning position, which will be a more democratic solution than the Plurality solution of Robert's Rules or the random selection of tossing a coin. Next Lower Choices solution is the best solution to use. 03/18/01 Donald Davison - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Note: In the following pages of Robert's Rules of Order, the term `repeated balloting' refers to the election method of merely repeating the balloting over and over in the hopes that enough votes will be changed on some ballot to result in a majority. No candidates are eliminated in the balloting. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised, 10th edition, 2000, pp. 411-414 §45 VOTING PROCEDURE Preferential Voting [aka Inving]: The term preferential voting refers to any of a number of voting methods by which, on a single ballot when there are more than two possible choices, the second or less-preferred choices of voters can be taken into account if no candidate or proposition attains a majority. While it is more complicated than other methods of voting in common use and is not a substitute for the normal procedure of repeated balloting until a majority is obtained, preferential voting is especially useful and fair in an election by mail if it is impractical to take more than one ballot. In such cases it makes possible a more representative result than under a rule that a plurality shall elect. It can be used only if expressly authorized in the bylaws. Preferential voting has many variations. One method is described here by way of illustration. On the preferential ballot--for each office to be filled or multiple-choice question to be decided--the voter is asked to indicate the order in which he prefers all the candidates or propositions, placing the numeral [1] beside his first preference, the numeral 2 Page 411 beside his second preference, and so on for every possible choice. In counting the votes for a given office or question, the ballots are arranged in piles according to the indicated first preferences--one pile for each candidate or proposition. The number of ballots in each pile is then recorded for the tellers' report. These piles remain identified with the names of the same candidates or propositions throughout the counting procedure until all but one are eliminated as described below. If more than half of the ballots show one candidate or proposition indicated as first choice, that choice has a majority in the ordinary sense and the candidate is elected or the proposition is decided upon. But if there is no such majority, candidates or propositions are eliminated one by one, beginning with the least popular, until one prevails, as follows: The ballots in the thinnest pile--that is, those containing the name designated as first choice by the fewest number of voters--are redistributed into the other piles according to the names marked as second choice on these ballots. The number of ballots in each remaining pile after this distribution is again recorded. If more than half of the ballots are now in one pile, that candidate or proposition is elected or decided upon. If not, the next least popular candidate or proposition is similarly eliminated, by taking the thinnest remaining pile and redistributing its ballots according to their second choices into the other piles, except that, if the name eliminated in the last distribution is indicated as second choice on a ballot, that ballot is placed according to its third choice. Again the number of ballots in each existing pile is recorded, and, if necessary, the process is repeated--by redistributing each time the ballots in the thinnest remaining pile, according to the marked second choice or most-preferred choice among those not yet eliminated--until one pile contains more than half of the ballots, the result being thereby determined. The tellers' report consists of a table listing all candidates or Page 412 propositions, with the number of ballots that were in each pile after each successive distribution. If a ballot having one or more names not marked with any numeral comes up for placement at any stage of the counting and all of its marked names have been eliminated, it should not be placed in any pile, but should be set aside. If at any point two or more candidates or propositions are tied for the least popular position, the ballots in their piles are redistributed in a single step, all of the tied names being treated as eliminated. In the event of a tie in the winning position--which would imply that the elimination process is continued until the ballots are reduced to two or more equal piles--the election should be resolved in favor of the candidate or proposition that was strongest in terms of first choices (by referring to the record of the first distribution). If more than one person is to be elected to the same type of office--for example, if three members of a board are to be chosen--the voters can indicate their order of preference among the names in a single fist of candidates, just as if only one was to be elected. The counting procedure is the same as described above, except that it is continued until all but the necessary number of candidates have been eliminated (that is, in the example, all but three). [aka Bottoms Up] When this or any other system of preferential voting is to be used, the voting and counting procedure must be precisely established in advance and should be prescribed in detail in the bylaws of the organization. The members must be thoroughly instructed as to how to mark the ballot, and should have sufficient understanding of the counting process to enable them to have confidence in the method. Sometimes, for instance, voters decline to indicate a second or other choice, mistakenly believing that such a course increases the chances of their first choice. In fact, it may prevent any candidate from receiving a majority and require Page 413 the voting to be repeated. The persons selected as tellers must perform their work with particular care. The system of preferential voting just described should not be used in cases where it is possible to follow the normal procedure of repeated balloting until one candidate or proposition attains a majority. Although this type of preferential ballot is preferable to an election by plurality, it affords less freedom of choice than repeated balloting, because it denies voters the opportunity of basing their second or lesser choices on the results of earlier ballots, and because the candidate or proposition in last place is automatically eliminated and may thus be prevented from becoming a compromise choice. Page 414 --end