I'll be more specific. Suppose that there are three candidates A, B, and
C , of which your favorite is A, and that there are five voters. You ask
the other four ahead of time what their utilities for the three candidates
are. They trust that Cranor's method is strategy proof, so they frankly
I doubt the method is non-monotonic; the counting is done by Approval.
The reason you got the A answer the first time is that you fed the other
voters' information into the simulation of the election. The strategizer in
the real election only improves your vote over the simulated election if
the
with
the blue and red dots - the dots never settle on just one colour, they keep
changing forever.
-Original Message-
From: Richard Moore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Sunday, 22 April 2001 6:11
To: Forest Simmons
Cc: Election Methods
Subject: Re: [EM] Unranked-IRV, Cumulative, and Normalized
It seems pretty clear that at some point you have to make a trade-off
between electing the candidate with the highest SU, and ensuring that
your method has low strategy. However, its unclear at what point you
have to start making a trade off - it is conceivable that there are
methods out
I understand the question and it does seem paradoxical. Since I don't know
the details about the method I can only speculate.
Imagine that each voter is given a computer which is running a standard piece
of software that implements a standard strategy algorithm. The software
takes a voter's
This is more of a query about Lori Cranor's method than anything else.
If it really gives no strategic incentive for distorting ratings, it
sounds like the ideal way to use CR ballots.
Here's what puzzles me. On the one hand, it seems like any method like Ms
Cranor's that uses CR ballots to
Richard Moore wrote:
...unless the voters let the system do the strategizing for them.
[snip]
would the voters have any reason to give insincere ratings
(assuming they understand and trust the system)?
They might want to give insincere ratings to try and distort the strategies of
their
Forest Simmons wrote:
On Sat, 7 Apr 2001, Richard Moore wrote (in part):
I would be more interested in finding a way to reward sincere voting in
a CR system. But it seems unlikely that such a method exists.
As you said, normalization with the L2 norm does yield near sincere voting
Bart Ingles wrote:
Richard Moore wrote:
Cumulative voting allows the voter to give different-sized votes to each
candidate, providing that the total of all his votes is less than or equal
to some constant. What Tom is proposing, I think, is that the voter has
a single vote that may be
