>> From: Blake Cretney
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Voting on matters of pure fact
[Response buried in the quotes. Sorry, the quotes form a
unified whole, and resist trimming.]
>> Here's another interesting situation. Lets say you lock a group of
>> people in a room, and
Here's another interesting situation. Lets say you lock a group of
people in a room, and present two proposals to them. You ask each
person to quantify how much each proposal benefits him or her
personally. They all vote sincerely. Maybe they're really honest.
If the voters choose based on en
>> In juries, jurors prefer a choice because it is a better
>> fit of the facts. Of course, their subjective or
>> performance-based competencies could be factored into
>> computing the collective outcome. The Shapley-Grofman
>> theorem does this.
>
>That's a thought. Juries hadn't occurred to me
>> From: Arnold B. Urken
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Voting on matters of pure fact
>> Hi,
>> I have been following this list with interest and would
>> like to point out that there is a literature (going back
>> to Condorcet) about the effects of a voting method o
Hi,
I have been following this list with interest and would like to point
out that there is a literature (going back to Condorcet) about the
effects of a voting method on the group probability of making a correct
choice. (See my "The Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of
Social Choice
>> From: Blake Cretney
>> Subject: [EM] Social Utility
[snip]
>> But let's say you have a group of people voting on whether
>> the universe will always expand, or will eventually
>> contract. This is an objective question. The correct
>> answer is independent of the will of the voters, and to
