CTED]>
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [EM] Consensus?: IRV vs. Primary w/Runoff
>
[...]
> In other words, the simulation versus the real thing was the more
> interesting comparison to me. In the case of TTR, there is no appreciable
> difference (besides the potential secon
On Tue, 5 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
>
> Of course, then you have to explain why it is bad for an election method
> to be "erratic".
>
Adam gave the explanation in his example. My only contribution was to
describe the behavior of IRV as "erratic" in that context, and give a
homely analo
On Tue, 5 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote in part:
>
> My argument is that in so far as IRV meets majority for solid coalitions
> and independence from clones, IRV can hardly be called "erratic" compared
> to primary with runoff. You didn't address my argument. Check the
> paragraph of mine tha
Dear Forest,
you wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> Markus wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> > In so far as IRV meets majority for solid coalitions and independence
> > from clones, IRV can hardly be called "erratic" compared to primary
> > with runoff.
>
> Evidently the "erratic" that I have described is different from
Dear Mike,
you wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> Markus wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> > In so far as IRV meets majority for solid coalitions and independence
> > from clones, IRV can hardly be called "erratic" compared to primary
> > with runoff.
>
> IRV is erratic because it requires strict ordering, collects a ran
Forest wrote in part-
It seems to me that election methods can potentially have two kinds of
problems with clones: (1) Some methods tend to give an advantage to
parties that runs lots of clones. (2) Other methods tend to penalize
parties that run lots of clones.
---
D- The *cloneness* level is so
On Mon, 4 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Forest,
>
> you wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> > It seems to me that election methods can potentially have two kinds of
> > problems with clones: (1) Some methods tend to give an advantage to
> > parties that runs lots of clones. (2) Other methods tend to
Dear Forest,
you wrote (4 Feb 2002):
> It seems to me that election methods can potentially have two kinds of
> problems with clones: (1) Some methods tend to give an advantage to
> parties that runs lots of clones. (2) Other methods tend to penalize
> parties that run lots of clones.
Actually,
On Sat, 2 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Forest,
>
> you wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> > Markus wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> > > Forest wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> > > > It seems to me that Primary with Runoff is virtually independent from
> > > > clones, too, because it would take at least a two thirds majo
Dear Forest,
you wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> Markus wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> > Forest wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> > > It seems to me that Primary with Runoff is virtually independent from
> > > clones, too, because it would take at least a two thirds majority to
> > > get two clones as finalists, unless the vot
Forest wrote in part-
I don't claim that Runoff will always pick the CW, only more often than
IRV.
D- So what are the odds that a CW will be in the final 2 with IRV or in the
top 2 with Runoff ???
As usual I note that a single winner choice either gets a YES majority (of
desired votes plu
On Fri, 1 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Forest,
>
> you wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> > But (as I argued in a previous posting) the CW is less likely to survive
> > the tortuous path to the final round in IRV, especially considering all of
> > the propaganda telling voters that they can vote
Dear Forest,
you wrote (1 Feb 2002):
> But (as I argued in a previous posting) the CW is less likely to survive
> the tortuous path to the final round in IRV, especially considering all of
> the propaganda telling voters that they can vote their sincere preference
> order and still end up with "T
On Fri, 1 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Forest,
>
> you wrote (31 Jan 2002):
> > The more manipulable a method is, the easier it eliminates the
> > sincere Condorcet Winner. A method that places a premium on
> > first place preferences and still eliminates the CW, even when
> > the CW h
Dear Forest,
you wrote (31 Jan 2002):
> The more manipulable a method is, the easier it eliminates the
> sincere Condorcet Winner. A method that places a premium on
> first place preferences and still eliminates the CW, even when
> the CW has the greatest first place preference, is a very
> manip
On Thu, 31 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote in part:
> remains true that some methods are more manipulatable than others. I am only
> claiming that IRV is LESS manipulatable than the primary w/runoff procedure
> when there are 4 or more candidates.
Why do you believe this?
Here's a rule of thumb t
bout an example showing a case where the IRV is more
manipulatable than the Plurality Primary w/Runoff.
SB
> Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2002 02:23:24 EST
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: Consensus?: IRV vs. Primary w/Runoff
>
> Forest wrote-
>
> All s
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote-
Let me try to clarify what I meant in the previous message. First, here is a
definition.
Primary w/Runoff:
Elected candidate shall receive 50% plus one or more of the votes cast. If
more
than two people are nominated, a run-off shall occur between the two people
who
re
On Wed, 30 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote in part:
> Forest:
>
> Let me try to clarify what I meant in the previous message. First, here is a
> definition.
>
> Primary w/Runoff:
> Elected candidate shall receive 50% plus one or more of the votes cast. If more
> than two people are nominated, a
ED]>
> To: Election_Methods-list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Consensus?: IRV vs. Primary w/Runoff
>
> On Tue, 29 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
>
> > Do we have a consensus that the instant runoff vote (IRV) is MATHEMATICALLY
> > better than the common two s
On Tue, 29 Jan 2002, Bart Ingles wrote:
>
>
> Forest Simmons wrote:
> >
> > Another angle just occurred to me: a simulation of the two step runoff
> > might be preferable to the IRV simulation of the many step runoff.
>
> I believe this is what is known in Britain as the "supplemental vote".
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote-
Do we have a consensus that the instant runoff vote (IRV) is MATHEMATICALLY
better than the common two step plurality vote (primary) with a follow-up
runoff between the 2 top plurality vote getters? It seems to me that it cannot
be worse, given that manipulation is bad. A
Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Another angle just occurred to me: a simulation of the two step runoff
> might be preferable to the IRV simulation of the many step runoff.
I believe this is what is known in Britain as the "supplemental vote".
The other problem here is that you need to anticipate wh
If talking about local non-partisan elections, I don't see much
difference. Really, the math of IRV is so complex I don't see how you
can make many claims about it either way vs. a system as similar as
two-round runoff. One drawback of IRV is the possibility of a
paradoxical outcome following a
On Tue, 29 Jan 2002, Forest Simmons wrote:
> On Tue, 29 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
>
> > Do we have a consensus that the instant runoff vote (IRV) is MATHEMATICALLY
> > better than the common two step plurality vote (primary) with a follow-up
> > runoff between the 2 top plurality vote getter
On Tue, 29 Jan 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
> Do we have a consensus that the instant runoff vote (IRV) is MATHEMATICALLY
> better than the common two step plurality vote (primary) with a follow-up
> runoff between the 2 top plurality vote getters? It seems to me that it cannot
> be worse, given tha
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