On Sat, 28 Dec 2002 20:18:53 +1300 Craig Carey wrote:
At 02\12\27 22:38 -0500 Friday, Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Craig --
I will never understand what you write if I cannot even start
from the same place. In the following example, I see
13 "papers" as you say, 4 "candidates" (na
At 2002\12\28 20:18 +1300 Saturday, Craig Carey wrote:
>At 2002\12\27 22:38 -0500 Friday, Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon wrote:
...
>This seems to be only about the default meaning of a term that is using
>less words than are needed to get its meaning pinned down. So the thread
...
I have a q
At 02\12\27 22:38 -0500 Friday, Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Craig --
I will never understand what you write if I cannot even start
from the same place. In the following example, I see
13 "papers" as you say, 4 "candidates" (namely A,B,C,D) and 4 different
kinds of ballots or "posit
Craig --
I will never understand what you write if I cannot even start
from the same place. In the following example, I see
13 "papers" as you say, 4 "candidates" (namely A,B,C,D) and 4 different
kinds of ballots or "positions" as said Forest (namely ABCD, BDAC,
CDAB , DBCA)
Am I right?
Steph.
At 02\12\27 13:42 -0800 Friday, Forest Simmons wrote:
...
>Put candidates A,B,C, and D at the vertices of a tetrahedron
>whose respective edges AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and DC have lengths of
>5,7,8,9,4, and 6, respectively.
>
>If A, B, C, and D have 5, 4, 3, and 1 avid supporters, respectively,
>locate
5 ABCD
4 BDAC
3 CDAB
1 DBCA
...
P.S. The minimum total distance criterion would give the win to A in the
above example. IRV also picks A. Who would win under the rules of Ranked
Pairs?
Forest --
all preferences are expressed so all criteria give the same result:
A (8) > B (5), A (9) > C
On Wed, 18 Dec 2002, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> By the way, it turns out that in the three candidate case, if the
> preference ballots are generated in this way, regardless of the metric
> used in step 2, a CW is assured; there can be no cycle.
>
> So somewhere in this 5 step process the cyclical
At 02\12\20 23:04 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
>> At 02\12\20 14:16 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
>> >Craig Carey wrote (in part):
>> >>
>> >> It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
>> >> about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like th
> At 02\12\20 14:16 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
> >Craig Carey wrote (in part):
> >>
> >> It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
> >> about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like this:
> >>
> >> 1(ABC) = ((ABCDEF) + (ABCDFE) + (ABCEDF) +
At 02\12\20 14:16 + Friday, James Gilmour wrote:
>Craig Carey wrote (in part):
>>
>> It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
>> about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like this:
>>
>> 1(ABC) = ((ABCDEF) + (ABCDFE) + (ABCEDF) + (ABCEFD) + (ABCFDE)
Craig Carey wrote (in part):
>
> It might seem that in a 6 candidate election, the paper (ABC) is more
> about A,B,C, than about D,E,F. But it can be expanded out like this:
>
> 1(ABC) = ((ABCDEF) + (ABCDFE) + (ABCEDF) + (ABCEFD) + (ABCFDE) + (ABCFED))/6
>
> So every single paper is a paper that ca
Hi Forest.
I find your message incomprehensible and most of the problem is with the
English words. This is not a message that is sent merely to create an
opportunity for you to subsequently write nothing. The geometry of
voting is somewhat really simple. There is plain space and a dimension
for
The geometry is not obviously Euclidean since there might not ever be a
formula that calculates the Euclidean distance (the square root of the
sum of the squares of differences in the weights, over all kinds of
papers). Also rules that use normalised weights seem to be less likely.
Suppose there
Here's the version of Candidate Space (CS) that I like the best now:
The ballots must have some way of determining favorite, so must have at
least the expressivity of Majority Choice ballots.
[The favorite on the expressive side of the ballot must have maximal
positive instrumentality in the inst
I took it for granted that "favorite" would also be among the approved on
Majority Choice ballots, and that favorites would be determined from the
rankings or ratings in the case of CR or ranked ballots.
But I still think that CS as I proposed it suffers from a fault. If the
race is perceived as
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