This message from Blake is only a repetition of his past arguments,
arguments that have been answered. I wouldn't bother to reply again
to what both I and Adam Tarr have already amply replied to, except that
there might be new members who haven't heard the previous
recyclings of these old margins
Sorry I haven't replied on this thread for a while. I think that I got
some agreement on some factual points, but didn't really explain why
these points mattered.
I admit that you can come up with examples where, because of irrational
voting, winning-votes is advantageous in terms of electing a
Sorry for the huge quote block at the top of this message, but I tried to
snip out that which was no longer relevant...
> >>> A beats B, 70% winning votes (25% losing)
> >>> B beats C, 52% winning votes (45% losing)
> >>> C beats A, 50% winning votes (40% losing)
> >>>
> >>> By virtue of a sligh
Adam Tarr wrote:
> Despite the fact that this debate has been on the list since long
> before I showed up, I really think we're making progress.
I agree.
>
> I wrote and Blake responded
>
>>> A beats B, 70% winning votes (25% losing)
>>> B beats C, 52% winning votes (45% losing)
>>> C b
I'd asked:
>Ok, winning in violation of majority rule, by truncation, in the way that
>can happen in margins methods--how will that happen in wv methods
>by flipping a coin?
Rob replied:
Say a voter's sincere vote is A>B>C and he could gain some advantage under
margins by insincerely votin
Mike wrote:
> Ok, winning in violation of majority rule, by truncation, in the way that
> can happen in margins methods--how will that happen in wv methods
> by flipping a coin?
Say a voter's sincere vote is A>B>C and he could gain some advantage under
margins by insincerely voting A>B=C. Under
On Mon, 1 Apr 2002 01:04:43 EST [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Adam wrote in part-
>
> One final thought. on 3/20 I posted a message about Approval Completed
> Condorcet. The idea was to use a graded ballot (ABCDEF, for example). If
> there was not a Condorcet winner, then the candidate with th
Rob LeGrand said:
I come from a mathematical background; specifically, I'm a student of game
theory. So I tend to be pessimistic: I'd rather assume that whatever voters
could do to help themselves, they will do. The argument that any insincere
strategy that works under margins also works by fl
ALL methods have problems with 3 or more choices due to having divided
majorities (if there is no first choice majority).
2 examples -- Initial votes in each example
26 AB
25 BA
49 Z
100
34 ABC
33 BCA
32 CAB
99
Who, if anybody, has a YES majority ???
If the initial polls do show any
Adam is certainly the most convincing winning-votes advocate I've seen on the
list (and I've never encountered one off-list). I like that he makes his (not
unreasonable) assumptions clear. It's hard to imagine a better case for
winning-votes, but until there's a better one, I'm still a "margins"
Despite the fact that this debate has been on the list since long before I
showed up, I really think we're making progress.
I wrote and Blake responded
>>A beats B, 70% winning votes (25% losing)
>>B beats C, 52% winning votes (45% losing)
>>C beats A, 50% winning votes (40% losing)
>>
>>By vir
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>I apologize for ataking a while to get back to this thread; I have been out of e-mail
>contact.
>
Take all the time you want. I far prefer thoughtful replies to speedy
ones, and I hope my own email reflects this.
>
>Blake wrote, I responded, and Blake wrote again,
>
Adam Tarr wrote:
>> The point is that if my first choice is A, the method penalizes me
>> for not choosing between B and C, by strengthening one or both
>> candidates, and therefore weakening A.
>
>
> Certainly not both candidates! In the zero-information election, you
> don't know which one
> Partial rankings are penalized.
I don't think it would be a strong exaggeration to characterize this as the
crux of your argument. You basically say, "Ranked Pairs ignores partial
rankings, while SSD does not. Since partial rankings are penalized, this
allows those who are unaware of this
In reply to:
>You're going to have to explain to me the scenario where some people try to
>strategically truncate in SSD, only to be burned for it.
>
Blake said:
Isn't that the point of your example? The Bush voters, not
understanding SSD, strategically truncate and are thwarted as a result
Rob Legrand said:
49:Bush>Gore=Nader
24:Gore>Bush=Nader
27:Nader>Gore>Bush
which should be equivalent to
49:Bush>Gore>Nader
49:Bush>Nader>Gore
24:Gore>Bush>Nader
24:Gore>Nader>Bush
54:Nader>Gore>Bush
I reply:
Why do you believe that's equivalent? In one case the Bush voters
express no prefe
On Thu, 21 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
> Forest wrote:
>
> >[...] if we interpret truncations as NO and ranked as YES.
> >
> >This time Bush wins, having greater approval than Gore.
> >
> >I suggest that this is a reasonable interpretation, and that the resulting
> >version of Approval Complete
On Thu, 21 Feb 2002, [iso-8859-1] Alex Small wrote:
>
> Why not go one step further and give voters more flexibility? Simply ask
> them to give each candidate a rank, and also a yes/no. The ballot wouldn't
> be all that much more complicated. Then they could participate in every
> pairwise
>Are you claiming that it is always, or generally, a bad idea to give a
>complete ranking in RP. I believe that to be false. If you don't have
>any particular strategic knowledge, you should give a full ranking.
I agree, it is unlikely that this is always the case. In my example,
however,
Forest wrote:
>[...] if we interpret truncations as NO and ranked as YES.
>
>This time Bush wins, having greater approval than Gore.
>
>I suggest that this is a reasonable interpretation, and that the resulting
>version of Approval Completed Condorcet is not too shabby.
The problem with handling
Adams latest example-
49: Bush
12: Gore, Bush
12: Gore, Nader
27: Nader,Gore
Bush beats Nader 61-39
Nader beats Gore 27-24
Gore beats Bush 51-49
---
D- Now there is a circular tie.
Again- who, if anybody, has a YES majority ???
On Thu, 21 Feb 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Adams latest example-
>
> 49: Bush
> 12: Gore, Bush
> 12: Gore, Nader
> 27: Nader,Gore
>
> Bush beats Nader 61-39
> Nader beats Gore 27-24
> Gore beats Bush 51-49
> ---
> D- Now there is a circular tie.
>
> Again- who, if anybody, has a YES maj
Blake wrote:
>So, is the point of your example that the Bush voter's are dishonest
>then?
Dishonest? Is all strategic voting tantamount to dishonesty? If so,
then I agree that the Bush voters are dishonest. If not, I see no
reason to slander the (imaginary) Bush voters like that. Their
Adam Tarr wrote:
> This is a totally reasonable strategic truncation on the part of the
> Bush camp. They have nothing to lose, since Nader is a sure loser
> anyway, and the election to gain. If these people vote Gore second
> (which is their obvious second choice) then all they do is make G
On Wed, 20 Feb 2002, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> Adam wrote:
> > 49: Bush
> > 24: Gore
> > 27: Nader,Gore
> >
> > Bush beats Nader 49-27
> > Nader beats Gore 27-24
> > Gore beats Bush 51-49
> >
> > With ranked pairs, the Gore-Bush defeat is overturned, and Bush wins,
> > despite a true majority prefer
Rob wrote:
>I think the reason the winning-votes method seems more intuitive in this
>case is that, looking at the votes, there seem to be 49 Bush voters and 51
>Gore/Nader voters, so a Bush result seems wrong. But that's
>misleading. The 24 Gore voters don't prefer Nader to Bush. If they h
Adam wrote:
> 49: Bush
> 24: Gore
> 27: Nader,Gore
>
> Bush beats Nader 49-27
> Nader beats Gore 27-24
> Gore beats Bush 51-49
>
> With ranked pairs, the Gore-Bush defeat is overturned, and Bush wins,
> despite a true majority preferring Gore to Bush. In SSD the Nader-Gore
> defeat gets overturne
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