Adam wrote in part-
Nobody has seriously advocated the use of Condorcet voting in multi-winner
elections.
---
D- Not quite.
Condorcet in the single winner case is the limiting case of Condorcet in the
multiple winner case.
2 or more Test Winners versus Test Loser (Others deemed Other Test L
- Original Message -
From: "Adam Tarr" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2002 9:50 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] falsifying voters' rankings--no.
>
> >We thus have the following ordering:
> >(C,V) S
> >V S C
>We thus have the following ordering:
>(C,V) S
>V S C
>S (V, C)
>We thus have the following ordering:
>(C,V) S
>V S C
>S (V, C)
Vanilla is the Condorcet winner. Chocolate is the Condorcet loser. No
need to assume preferences among the voted indifferences. Perhaps an
example that truly prod
- Original Message -
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, April 09, 2002 7:37 PM
Subject: [EM] falsifying voters' rankings--no.
> Rouse continues:
>
> 3. We get a net gain in social utility if we replace t
Michael Rouse said:
Here is an idea to prevent strategic truncation and ties
I reply:
Strategic truncation, defensive truncation, is what deters order-reversal in
the wv methods. It's what prevents the election from
having the order-reversal problem that Margins has.
Rouse continues:
Let's
