A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.
RFC 8940
Title: Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Session-Id
Derivation for EAP Subscriber Identity Module
(EAP-SIM), EAP Authentication and Key
Dear Mohit Sethi,
The session(s) that you have requested have been scheduled.
Below is the scheduled session information followed by
the original request.
emu Session 1 (2:00 requested)
Friday, 20 November 2020, Session I 1200-1400
Room Name: Room 7 size: 507
I think we have agreement on what the derivation would be now it's a matter
of clearly describing it. Here is a proposal:
IMCK[j] = the first 60 bytes of TLS-PRF(S-IMCK[j-1], "Inner Methods
Compound Keys", IMSK[j])
where "|" denotes concatenation and the TLS-PRF is defined in
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 9:11 AM Jouni Malinen wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 02:14:45PM -0700, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 12:11 PM Jouni Malinen wrote:
> >
> > > On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 09:30:33AM -0700, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> > > > Errata 5127:
There were so many messages in this thread that I'm not going try to
address each point separately, but I think in general I do agree with
the comments and it looks like all the identified implementation are
doing the same thing here..
I don't see any strong need to encode the output length of
On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 05:44:33PM +0300, Oleg Pekar wrote:
> The Authority-ID TLV is used by the client to identify the TEAP server it
> is talking to. If the same client talks to more than one TEAP server - it
> can keep PACs or cached data from all of them identified by
> the Authority-ID. If
On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 02:14:45PM -0700, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 12:11 PM Jouni Malinen wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 09:30:33AM -0700, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> > > Errata 5127: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5127
> > > Proposed State: Verified
> > >
On Oct 23, 2020, at 3:37 AM, Hannes Tschofenig
wrote:
> I do not understand certificate revocation checking is a topic specific to
> the use of TLS 1.3 in EAP-TLS.
It's not.
However, in the absence of another specification, we need to say *something*
for EAP-TLS.
> If this topic is
Hi Joe,
I do not understand certificate revocation checking is a topic specific to the
use of TLS 1.3 in EAP-TLS.
If this topic is important to the group then why isn’t this a generic
recommendations for all EAP methods that use public key based authentication?
Wouldn’t this be a topic to
So I’m a client and include a certificate status request. The EAP server isn’t
talking to the CA at the moment. Does a nonce have to be used? If so… #fail.
If not, what prevents a replay? And if the answer is nothing, what is the
threat model we are addressing?
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