Re: [Emu] [Lake] EDHOC rekey

2023-01-29 Thread Tero Kivinen
John Mattsson writes: > Tero Kivinen wrote: > > > and doing Diffie-Hellman for each of them would be too costly > > I agree that was true in the past. Do you think that is still the > case for an optimized implementation of modern algorithms running on > new CPUs? As I wrote in draft-mattsson-tls

Re: [Emu] [Lake] EDHOC rekey

2023-01-29 Thread John Mattsson
Hi, one more reflection on this: - People have requested EDHOC as well as EAP with PSK authentication. For the first protocol run (i.e., not resumption) ephemeral key exchange should be a requirement. A PSK with ephemeral ECDH mode can be used for more than resumption. Tero Kivinen wrote: > a

Re: [Emu] [Lake] EDHOC rekey

2023-01-29 Thread Tero Kivinen
Rafa Marín López writes: > Hi John: > - 2) Use PSK with ECDHE (similar to psk_dhe_ke in TLS) > > Let me also add here, as a reference, IKEv2. Basically, section 1.3.2 in RFC > 7296 shows a 1-RTT exchange including DH exchange and nonces to regenerate the > IKE security association. > > -

Re: [Emu] [Lake] EDHOC rekey

2023-01-29 Thread Rafa Marín López
Hi John: > El 26 ene 2023, a las 0:25, John Mattsson > escribió: > > Hi Rafa, > > Thanks for bringing up this question. I think this is a very good discussion > to have at this point. > > First discussion is probably why resumption is needed. I think there are > three things that can be m