Norman Samish wrote:
> If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then
> Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined
> we have free will. He says, "the only relevant question as
> to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds
> (our selves) determine our act
Norman Samish wrote:
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable.
To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's actions
must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most
fundamental level, this must be quantum indeterminacy.
This is n
If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then Jonathan is right, and
to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, "the only
relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious
minds (our selves) determine our actions."
But what about the suffer
Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers of schizophrenia, which
may be seen as disorders of free will:
1. Command auditory hallucinations. The patient hears voices commanding him
to do sometimes horrific things, which he feels he *must* obey, and often
does obey, even though he does n
This discussion is exhibiting the usual confusion about what free will
means. The concept itself is incoherent as generally used (taken as meaning
my actions are not determined). But then in this case they must be merely
random (which is hardly an improvement), or we require recourse to a
Descartia
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:30:25AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I agree that "the purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from
> happening again"; at least, this is what the purpose of punishment ought to
> be. But note that this *does* imply an assumption about the reasons
Russell Standish writes:
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on
Russel, Stathis
I agree that free will and legal responsibility are different. Free
will is a subjective concept. It is a feeling that one has
about being "master" of one's decisions. In the terminology used in
this list, free will is also a "first person" issue.
Legal responsibility is an o
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on
whether the case is ci
Hi Stathis:
I left out that Turing's result seem to point towards a conclusion that the
set of universe descriptions does not form a continuum but rather a
countable set and thus these descriptions can generally differ by too large
an amount to store all prior quantum level states - too coarse
Hi Stathis:
My argument is that Turing's result points towards the MWI and makes it a
deterministic outcome but I so far see no reason why all worlds should run
concurrently. So the judge's "decision" you experience "now" is an
indeterminate [random] selection from all possible outcomes and giv
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