On Wed, 2005-05-11 at 11:46, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> Eric Cavalcanti writes:
> > Let's define a turing machine M with a set of internal states Q,
> > an initial state s, a binary alphabet G={0,1}. The transition
> > function is f: Q X G -> Q X G X {L,R} , i.e., the function
> > determines from the in
Bruno, Lee:
Le 10-mai-05, à 06:33, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Why not instead adopt the scientific model? That is, that
we are three-dimensional creatures ensconced in a world
governed by the laws of physics, or, what I'll call the
"atoms and processes" model.
Because we don't need that hypothesis.
Tha
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
> Let's define a turing machine M with a set of internal states Q,
> an initial state s, a binary alphabet G={0,1}. The transition
> function is f: Q X G -> Q X G X {L,R} , i.e., the function
> determines from the internal state and the symbol at the pointer
> which symbol t
I think some of the discussions about COMP and simulating people
could be better understood if we can first understand a (much)
simpler problem: a harmonic oscillator.
The relevance of this is that ultimately there might be no meaning
in saying that a string in Platonia or wherever represents anyt
The Grover algorithm is a form of accessing information from other
worlds. Of course the worlds need to be prepared in just the right
way, of course...
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 01:01:32PM -0400, danny mayes wrote:
> >
> I'm not one to shy away from what others would perceive to be "unbridled
> spe
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 04:44:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Goldblatt (see ref in my thesis) has made also a startling modal
> analysis of Minkowsky space time through an old greek Diodorean
> modality, which I wish to extract in the arithmetical frame imposed by
> comp, but I don't even
On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 07:19:01AM -0400, Jeanne Houston wrote:
> I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively
> new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain
> during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it
> may
I vaguely recollect the phenomenon you mention, if I am thinking of the same
thing. The problem is that when something "goes wrong", either in a brain or
in another machine, in the vast majority of cases it will result in some
sort of dysfunction. If you took to your computer with a hammer, ther
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 08:55:00PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, unbeknownst
> to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a universe with your exact
> mind in it to be created purely de novo is astronomically unlikely.
>
That's the wrong w
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
>> And what do you think of life insurance? Suppose you have young children
>> whom you love dearly, for whom you are the sole support, and who will
>> suffer greatly if you die without insurance?
Do you agree with this ?
1- whenever there is
Lee Corbin writes:
> Why not instead adopt the scientific model? That is, that
> we are three-dimensional creatures ensconced in a world
> governed by the laws of physics, or, what I'll call the
> "atoms and processes" model. About observer-moments, I would
> say what LaPlace answered to Napoleon
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I happen to be a believer in the observer-moment as
fundamental, and the only thing one can be sure of from the first
person perspective. "I think, therefore I am" is taking it too far in
deducing the existence of an observer; "I think, therefore there is a
thought"
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 20:14, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
> Yet you have already been unconscious forever, before your birth (if we
> pretend/assume that the universe is infinite in both time directions).
It can't be forever... I'm conscious now... so it was not "forever". But I
know you'll say infinity
Quentin Anciaux writes:
> but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is to
> experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where you
> have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can
> only experience world where you are
Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
> be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
> is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
>
> Hal Finney
Hi,
but by definition of wha
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal,
> >I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
> >guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
> >concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
> >we are young and living within a normal
aet.radal ssg wrote:
Dear Jeanne:
Message -
From: "Jeanne Houston"
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" ,
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I didn't read the article but I am aware of the conceptual basis
for t
Dear Jeanne:
Message - From: "Jeanne Houston" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Tue, 10 May 2005 07:19:01 -0400
I didn't read the article but I am aware of the conceptual basis for this idea
Hal wrote:
> I agree that in our particular universe the role of time is complex<
IF there is anything that is not complex...
Time is definitely not a Ding an sich, definitely not a 'thing' and as
agreed: we really don't know how to identify that word. The phenomena we
assign as 'time related'
Hi Danny,
First there is a basic notion of TIME which is taken as primitive (and
perhaps related to the TIME hypothesis of Russell Standish, I don't
know) and which is just the (first order logic) notion of successive
natural numbers. This TIME is fixed and lives atemporally in Platonia,
and co
Dear Stathis:- Original Message -From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortalityDate: Mon, 09 May 2005 23:02:18 +1000> > Dear aet.radal ssg,> > I think you missed my point about the amnesic and ps
Le 10-mai-05, à 05:55, Hal Finney a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
where
we are young and living within a normal l
Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
where
we are young and living within
Bruno,
You've probably already addressed this recently, but given the number of
posts and my work load I have not been able to read the much of the list
recently. What does comp make of time? Is it merely some measure of
the relationships among bitstrings in platonia?
Danny
Bruno Marchal wro
Le 09-mai-05, à 19:39, Brent Meeker a écrit :
In what sense does "the program" exist if not as physical tokens? Is
it
enough
that you've thought of the concept? The same "program", i.e.
bit-string,
does
different things on different computers. So how can the program
instantiate
reality indepe
Le 10-mai-05, à 06:33, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Why not instead adopt the scientific model? That is, that
we are three-dimensional creatures ensconced in a world
governed by the laws of physics, or, what I'll call the
"atoms and processes" model.
Because we don't need that hypothesis.
That's nice bec
I once read an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively
new field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain
during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was that it
may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that schizophrenics were
Le 10-mai-05, à 08:10, Hal Finney a écrit :
I'm not sure how to interpret the "z" in "x represents y to z". If a
computer generates string y from string x, is the computer the z?
And as for Chaitin's algorithmic complexity, I am afraid that you have
it backward, that it does apply to finite string
Hal,
I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are
guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment
concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where
we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are
at a very
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