Le 19-mai-05, à 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
not
Turing -computable, I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
'comp'.
I would like to insist on this key
Le 19-mai-05, à 21:51, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
(maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
not
Turing -computable, I think that is different from
Gentlemachines ;)
Le 19-mai-05, à 22:15, Norman Samish a écrit :
Gentlemen,
Thank you for many illuminating replies to the Why does anything
exist?
question. Three are shown below. It's clear that some hold that
there is
an identity between physical and mathematical existence (although
Le 20-mai-05, à 02:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as
qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a
thing and being the thing. I hate the word dualism as much as you do
(because of the implication that
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 07:29:33AM -0700, James N Rose wrote:
I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to
an essential conceptual error that exists in the current
debating points of this topic, which in fact has been
an egregious error in logic for
Dear Freinds,
I apologize for not reading my own post more carefully before sending
them. My dislexia is acting up badly lately and my previous post was full of
terrible typos.
- Original Message -
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday,
Dear Jonathan,
Non-separateness and identity are not the same thing! Your argument
against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and
non-mutually dependent and thus lacking a linking mechanism dualism fails as
a viable theory. On the other hand, once we see the flaw in the
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jonathan,
Non-separateness and identity are not the same thing!
Your argument
against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and
non-mutually dependent and thus lacking a linking mechanism dualism
fails as
a viable theory. On the other hand, once we
Dear Joao,
Your point is well taken! My failure was to
point out that my 'rant' was against those that would claim that dualism can
never be a viable alternative, especially to a
Numbers-are-all-that-exists-monism.Thank you for pointingout that
such is calledPythagorianism.
OTOH, I see
From: "Jesse Mazer"<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 12 May 2005 14:48:17 -0400 Generally, unasked-for attempts at armchair psychology to explain the motivations of another poster on an internet
DearStephen,
I think I catch your point. As it happens the distinction Being/Becoming
(as Form/Substance)are very Aristotelian, both in origin
and in the way we use them. If the distinction has any meaning within
Platonism is probably as the reverse of the usual sense, i.e.,
Being only refers
Joao Leao wrote:
Dear Stephen,
I agree with you that the Forms "do not represent themselves to us"
and they remain independent of our chosen
representation --- if I understand you correctly --- that is, on how
we make our way back to them. But the latter
surely depends on sharpening this
From: Joao Leao
Our access to mathematical archetypes is in
this sense a map to help us make our way back
to the garden, as Joni Mitchell (that great
Platonist) would put it!
If I remember well - but I studied all that 35
years ago - Aristotle called all that 'hylomorphism',
from hule =
I am not sure that the Aristotelic term applied
to this. I see hylemorphism as the position that
matter beggets form (rather the other way
around which is the more platonic position).
I think it applies fully to the group of attempts
to build Relational (Classical and Quantum)
Theories of
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
- Original Message -
Subject: Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can
bruise you?
Hi,
Le Jeudi 19 Mai 2005 21:18, John M a écrit :
SNIP
I think that is what Bruno explains (rather my understanding of it),
that consciousness (a
aet writes
Jesse [writes]
but hey, this list is all about rambling speculations about
half-formed ideas that probably won't pan out to anything,
you could just as easily level the same accusation against
anyone here.
Well, a number of us are under the impression that we are being
very
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-mai-05, à 02:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as
qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a thing
and being the thing. I hate the word dualism as much as you do (because
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