Jesse Mazer wrote:
>Suppose there had already been a copy made, and the two of you
>were sitting side-by-side, with the torturer giving you the
>following options:
>
>A. He will flip a coin, and one of you two will get tortured
>B. He points to you and says "I'm definitely going to torture
>th
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> (JC) Now, the funny thing is, if you replace "torture" by
>"getting shot in
>> the head", then I will pick (2). That's interesting, isn't it?
>
>Why is that interesting? It's indistinguishable from a
>teleportation scenario.
Before thinking about it,
Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>> (JC) My consciousness (or degree of such) is a complicated function of my
>> evolutionary history, but the problem is so multifactorial it is
>> inappropriate to use anthropic reasoning.
>
>Nonsense. You are either conscious, in which case you will
>observe somethi
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 09:14:18PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >This argument is a variation of the argument for why we find
> >so many observers in our world, rather than being alone in the
> >universe, and is similar to why we expect the universe to be
> >so bi
Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> (JC) Now, the funny thing is, if you replace "torture" by
>"getting shot in
>> the head", then I will pick (2). That's interesting, isn't it?
>
>Why is that interesting? It's indistinguishable from a
>teleportation scenario.
Before thinking about it, I would have assumed t
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 09:06:22PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> Are you familiar with Wolframian CI systems?
Yes of course. Wolfram did not invent the term.
> The idea of CI is that while
> the system evolves deterministically, it is impossible (even in principle)
Russell Standish wrote:
>This argument is a variation of the argument for why we find
>so many observers in our world, rather than being alone in the
>universe, and is similar to why we expect the universe to be
>so big and old.
>
>Of course this argument contains a whole raft of ill-formed
>a
Russell Standish wrote:
>> A new (at least I think it is new) objection to the DA just occurred
>> to me (googling computational + irreducibility +doomsday
>came up blank).
>>
>> This objection (unfortunately) requires a few assumptions:
>>
>> 1) No "block" universe (ie. the universe is a proce
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 06:13:53PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux writes:
> > Why aren't we blind ? :-)
> >
> > If the "measure" of an OM come from the information complexity of it, it
> > seems
> > that an OM of a blind person need less information content because there is
> > no
Quentin Anciaux writes:
> Why aren't we blind ? :-)
>
> If the "measure" of an OM come from the information complexity of it, it
> seems
> that an OM of a blind person need less information content because there is
> no complex description of the outside world available to the blind observer.
>
The answer is probably something along the lines of:
OM with lots of sighted observers (as well as the odd blind one) will
have lower complexity than OMs containing only blind observers (since
the latter do not seem all that probable from an evolutionary point of
view).
Given there are
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 03:25:21AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> A new (at least I think it is new) objection to the DA just occurred to me
> (googling computational + irreducibility +doomsday came up blank).
>
> This objection (unfortunately) requires a few assumptions:
>
> 1) No "block" unive
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 07:43:49PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >Turing's thesis: Any process that can be naturally called an effective
> >procedure is realized by a Turing machine.
>
> Not OK. Please give me the page.
>
2nd edition, page 24, about 1/3 of the way down the page.
> >
> >Both
Le Lundi 20 Juin 2005 23:12, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
>
> The empirical question presents itself like this. Very simple universes
> (such as empty universes, or ones made up of simple repeating patterns)
> would have no life at all. Perhaps sufficiently complex ones would be
> full of life. So as
On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: -- we don't need to posit any kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic. We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and destroying them in our th
Le 21-juin-05, à 12:28, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 11:40:03AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-juin-05, ? 07:19, Russell Standish a ?crit :
Hmm - this is really a definition of a universal machine. That such a
machine exists is a theorem. Neither depend on the Churc
Le 21-juin-05, à 13:05, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Sorry, I can't let go of this one. I'm trying to understand it
psychologically.
Here's another thought experiment which is roughly equivalent to our
original scenario.
You are sitting in a room, with a not very nice man.
He gives you two opt
Stathis wrote:>To summarise my position, it is this: the measure of an observer moment is relevant when a given observer is contemplating what will happen next... Now, minimising acronym use, could you explain what your understanding is of how measure changes with number of copies of an OM which
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> You are sitting in a room, with a not very nice man.
>
> He gives you two options.
>
> 1) He'll toss a coin. Heads he tortures you, tails he doesn't.
>
> 2) He's going to start torturing you a minute from now. In the meantime, he
> shows you a button. If you press it, you
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 20-juin-05, =E0 18:16, Hal Finney a =E9crit :
> > That's true, from the pure OM perspective "death" doesn't make sense
> > because OMs are timeless. I was trying to phrase things in terms of
> > the observer model in my reply to Stathis. An OM wants to preserve
> > the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then in another post you just say:
It's a bit hard for me to come up with a satisfactory answer to this
problem, because I don't start from the assumption of a physical universe
at all--like Bruno, I'm trying to start from a measure on observer-moments
and hope that som
Le 21-juin-05, à 05:33, George Levy a écrit :
An interesting thought is that a psychological first person can surf simultaneously through a large number of physical OMs
With comp, we should say that the first person MUST surf simultaneously through an INFINITY of third person OMs.
(I would not
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 04:05:02AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> Now, the funny thing is, if you replace "torture" by "getting shot in the
> head", then I will pick (2). That's interesting, isn't it?
Why is that interesting? It's indistinguishable from a teleportation
scenario.
--
Eugen* Leit
Sorry, I can't let go of this one. I'm trying to understand it
psychologically.
Here's another thought experiment which is roughly equivalent to our
original scenario.
You are sitting in a room, with a not very nice man.
He gives you two options.
1) He'll toss a coin. Heads he tortures you, tai
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 11:40:03AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 17-juin-05, ? 07:19, Russell Standish a ?crit :
>
> >Hmm - this is really a definition of a universal machine. That such a
> >machine exists is a theorem. Neither depend on the Church-Turing
> >thesis, which says that any "effe
Le 20-juin-05, à 18:16, Hal Finney a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 19-juin-05, =E0 15:52, Hal Finney a =E9crit :
I guess I would say, I would survive death via anything that does not
reduce my measure.
But if the measure is absolute and is bearing on the OMs, and if
that=20
is only det
A new (at least I think it is new) objection to the DA just occurred to me
(googling computational + irreducibility +doomsday came up blank).
This objection (unfortunately) requires a few assumptions:
1) No "block" universe (ie. the universe is a process).
2) Wolframian computational irreducibil
On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 12:00:38AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> My consciousness (or degree of such) is a complicated function of my
> evolutionary history, but the problem is so multifactorial it is
> inappropriate to use anthropic reasoning.
Nonsense. You are eith
Russell Standish wrote:
> > I'd be interested to hear it. Here's something else you could look
> > at...calculate the median annual income for all humans
> alive today (I
> > believe it is around $4,000 /year), compare it to your own,
> and see if
> > you are anyway near the median. I predict
Russell Standish wrote:
> I retract an earlier agreement with Jonathon that the
> expected income argument is the same as the "Why I am not
> Chinese argument". They are not, for the simple expedient
> that ones income does not affect your chances of birth (if
> there is any effect, it would be
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