Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: > And read perhaps the literature on the mind body problem: all > materialist approaches has failed, and then the result I got explains > what it should be so. I have my own analysis of the problem: the words "map" and "territory" feature. > Actually you could perhaps e

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Georges Quénot
peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >> > Georges Quenot wrote: >> >> peterdjones wrote: >> >>> >> >>> "Epistemic objectivity of maths" means "every competent mathematician >> >>> gets the same answer to a given problem". It doesn't say anything about >> >>> the

Re: The Riemann Zeta Pythagorean TOE

2006-03-31 Thread daddycaylor
John, If I understand what you're asking: A digital recording of "Gone With The Wind", say on a CD, is recorded in bits, binary digits, 1's and 0's. You can also express pi in binary, it's simply the base-2 representation of pi, all 1's and 0's, just like the movie recording. So you have a

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Georges Quénot
Our messages becomes longer and longer. I will split my responses. I will start with this: peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: >> [...] >> Furthermore, most of this HP universe is >> in the brain of your nephew. What is in the game would be >> almost nothing without your nephew's imaginati

Re: The Riemann Zeta Pythagorean TOE

2006-03-31 Thread John M
Tom, may I humblly ask for an example, HOW you would imagine the 'sequence' in pi's infinite variety of numbers the connotation for "Gone With The Wind - the movie?" Just 'per apices', show the kind of sequence included, I don't want all the details. Thank you John M --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wr

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: ... > > If the universe were deterministic, then consicousness would have to > be epiphenomenal. I generally agree with you position that there is no reason to suppose that all mathematical structures are instantiated and that being instantiated is just what distinguishes physical a

Re: proper behavior for a mathematical substructure

2006-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 29-mars-06, à 21:58, Wei Dai a écrit : > > Is there a difference between physical existence and mathematical > existence? > I suggest thinking about this problem from a different angle. > > Consider a mathematical substructure as a rational decision maker. It > seems > to me that making a d

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 31-mars-06, à 16:52, 1Z a écrit : > Such a theory at least does not predict what is not observed. MM > over-predicts (white rabbits, Harry Potter) and under-explains (time, > consciousness). Read my old or recent papers before judging. Genrally the first part shows that comp makes physics

Re: The Riemann Zeta Pythagorean TOE

2006-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 31-mars-06, à 08:11, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Interesting!  This reminds me of the old standby example of being able to find any sequence of digits in the digits of pi, and therefore being able to find whole digital "recordings" of "Gone With The Wind" or anything you desire, including your

Re: The Riemann Zeta Pythagorean TOE

2006-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-mars-06, à 15:54, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > *Marc dances a jig with delight and claps Bruno on the back* > > A deliciously interesting post Bruno my dear fellow, a deliciously > interesting post! I'd be very interested to see anything else you have > on the Riemann Hypothesis and it

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 30-mars-06, à 20:22, 1Z a écrit : > > > I think > > that having a richer ontology automatically makes it easier > > to solve metaphysical problems, since you can say that X , Y or Z > > is intrinsic to the universe and therefore not to be "explained away" > > as somethi

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread 1Z
Georges Quenot wrote: > peterdjones wrote: > > Georges Quenot wrote: > >> peterdjones wrote: > >>> Georges Quénot wrote: > It is just the idea that there could be no difference between > mathematical existence and physical existence. > >>> Then why do we use two different words (ma

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-mars-06, à 20:22, 1Z a écrit : > I think > that having a richer ontology automatically makes it easier > to solve metaphysical problems, since you can say that X , Y or Z > is intrinsic to the universe and therefore not to be "explained away" > as something else This is so true that wit

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 31-mars-06, à 11:13, Georges Quenot a écrit (to Peter D Jones) >> Physical MWI is more constrained than mathematical >> multiverse theories, so there is not so much Harry-Potterness. > > This is just an opinion. It must refer to prejudices about > what physical MWI and mathematical multivers

Re: Numbers

2006-03-31 Thread Georges Quenot
peterdjones wrote: > Georges Quenot wrote: >> peterdjones wrote: >>> Georges Quénot wrote: It is just the idea that there could be no difference between mathematical existence and physical existence. >>> Then why do we use two different words (mathematical and physical) ? >> For v