Russell Standish writes:
> Consciousness is the state of "being like something" to use Nagel's> term. It is also the characteristic of the "reference class" in> Anthropic reasoning.> > Self-awareness is being aware of oneself as a distinct thing different> from the environment.> > It is not imm
Russell,
you mentioned the 'razor'man and I know you are a proven expert in
Occamistic ideas. So I ask for your opinion:
Is Occam's razor-thing not a perfect action of increasing the reductionist
limitations of a problem?
In 'cutting off' the 'nonessential' (pardon me for my layish expressions
Le 24-juil.-06, à 04:23, David Nyman a écrit :
>> Bruno: And this is perhaps the very root of a possible disagreement.
>> I would
>> not compare "mathematical" with "tautological", nor with
>> "conventional". This should be clear after the Godelian fall of
>> logicism. We know today that even
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 01:30:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> I am afraid your solon will just have this application: to give a non
> standard meaning to functionalism. Even a strict catholic can be a
> functionalist in that sense: just imagine that the solon, thanks to
> their n
Hi Colin,
"Either your "intrinsic parallelism" is turing emulable (by dovetailing
to name the standard recipe for implementing form of digital
parallelism), or it is not.
In the first case, you are under the comp conditions and you have to
accept its consequences. In the second case you are ju
Le 24-juil.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit :
> OTOH, materialism explains how qualia can be unrelated to computation.
Could you say how (without invoking words like "real")?
bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Le 21-juil.-06, à 08:05, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 04:38:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Functionalism is the same as comp, except that functionalist
>> traditionally presuppose some knowable high level of substitution (and
>> then like materialist presuppo
Russell Standish writes (quoting SP):
> > What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the> > mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a> > parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The> > projectile doesn't "create" the parabola, which e
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