Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
environment.
>>>
Hi, Stathis, Brent,
In multiverses, I think it's possible to say there exists one universe
which could include
only one (super) being with nothing else.
I mean this (super) being is the universe itself.
So this super being knows everything right at the beginning of this
universe.
No need and n
Brent meeker writes:
> >>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
> >>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
> >>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
> >>environment.
> >
> >
> > What about an intelligen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
>>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
>>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
>>environment.
>
>
> What
Brent Meeker writes:
> I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with
> which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes
> computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its
> environment.
What about an intelligent, conscious being sp
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>>>
>>>
>>>
>The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an
>unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their
>internal code every cloc
Le 29-juil.-06, à 18:23, David Nyman a écrit :
> "No doctor!" Or rather, it depends what you mean by 'what really
> describes me'. What I have argued is that, at the 'physical' level of
> description, running a hardware-independent computation could never
> 'really describe me' in one of the m
Le 28-juil.-06, à 22:15, David Nyman a écrit :
> In your comments above you refer to Platonism. It seems clear that if
> we are to regard mathematics or comp as having the kind of 'efficacy'
> (sorry, but what word would you prefer?), then we must indeed grant
> them some sort of Platonic ind
Peter Jones writes:
> > > I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual
> > > universe,
> > > because there isn't enough "room".
> >
> > If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all
> > the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very lim
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