Russell Standish writes:
> Precisely my point!
>
> On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> > > difference, or only a
> > > small amount of difference to the mea
Russell Standish writes:
> Precisely my point!
>
> On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> > > difference, or only a
> > > small amount of difference to the mea
David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Yes, and I despair (almost) of remedying this, even if I knew how. My
own attempts at linguistic 'clarity' seemed destined only to muddy the
waters further, especially as I'm really trying to translate from
personal modes that are often more visual/ kinaesthet
1Z wrote:
On 8/13/06, 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > but as I say, I can't help 'taking
> > personally' the existent thing from which I and all persons are
> > emanating. I think, imaginatvely, that if one pictures a 'block
> > universe', Platonia, MW, or any non-process conception of reality
1Z wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
...
>>Well, if 'experience' is the fact of *being* differentiable existence,
>>and 'the physical' is the observable relations thereof, then both
>>ultimately 'supervene' on there being something rather than nothing.
>
>
> No. There being something rather than no
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > 1) the don't seem to have, and they *are* what they seem
> > 2) they are incommunicable in mathematical, and hence
> > sructrural terms.
>
> 1) Well, this obviously depends on the subject of the seeming. To me,
> 'red', 'middle C', or 'bitter' all *do* seem t
1Z wrote:
> 1) the don't seem to have, and they *are* what they seem
> 2) they are incommunicable in mathematical, and hence
> sructrural terms.
1) Well, this obviously depends on the subject of the seeming. To me,
'red', 'middle C', or 'bitter' all *do* seem to possess a sort of
directly sensed
Colin,
Thanks for expressing "my ideas" so eloquently.
However... (of course!)
I may interspace some remarks (as usual) on details. (I am more lenient on
the oldies (do rely on them less) because our epistemic enrichment could
work only on the 'timely' level of comprehension (buildability-up on th
> I think this is wrongheaded. You doubt that you really assume "things are
> how they appear to me" - the Earth appears flat, wood appears solid, and
> electrons don't appear at all. What one does is build, or learn, a model
> that fits the world and comports with "how they appear". I see no
1Z wrote:
> That is, there is no plurality of substances with essential
> characteristics.
> Just one bare subtrate.
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bu
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Dear Norman,
>
> Thanks. I think this could help. I would not attribute "atomism" to
> Plato (except through Pythagorism and the "platonic notion of
> substance"), and "my" Plato is mainly the one from the Theaetetus and
> Parmenides.
> Recall me this when I will succeed to
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Why shouldn't they denote that ? And what has that to do with
> > substances ?
> > The inside/outside distinction can be asserted is a single-substance
> > universe. The inside/outside distinction is enough to found the 1st/3rd
> > person divide, what
> > do
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> The words 'direct probing' assume that indeed we are at some point
> "directly probing". If you can justify any account that we directly probe
> (whatever that means!) anything I'd like to see it!
I see what you mean. Francis Bacon described our enterprise as to 've
I will probably probably resend the last post, it seems some words are
lacking. Sorry. I will take the opportunity to make this one clearer
before the one on the hypostases.
Good week-end,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You rece
Dear Norman,
Thanks. I think this could help. I would not attribute "atomism" to Plato (except through Pythagorism and the "platonic notion of substance"), and "my" Plato is mainly the one from the Theaetetus and Parmenides.
Recall me this when I will succeed to explain the arithmetical hypostases
Hi,
Roadmap:
There are two things I can hardly separate: UDA, that is the Universal
Dovetailer Argument, which is an argument showing that if you take
seriously enough the hypothesis that we are digitalizable machine then
it follows that *necessarily* the physical laws, among more things (se
Nick: the "practical" - "philosopher".
I refer to my 'misunderstood' expression to Bruno:
"NAME Calling"
(which was a pun, meaning we "call" names and assign
meaning to it - in our OWN mindset, then fight for
THIS meaning against another person's meaning "called"
by the same NAME) - Bruno misu
"David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If grandmother asks for recalling the main difference between Plato and
Aristotle's theories of matter, I would just say that in Plato, the
visible (observable, measurable) realm is taken as appearances or
shadows related to a deeper
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