It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the discussions on
several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it right or
wrong?
This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question of faith,
in the
final analysis, as to whether you would accep
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > > > non-branching
> > > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
> > > > contingency in general
> > > > being du
Bruno
(BTW please delete any previous version of this posted in error.)
I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in 'as
if' mode. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning that we
could make explicit the choices that motivate our different ontic
starting assumptio
Right!
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
> Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioanno
Peter Jones writes:
> Computer programmes contain conditional (if-then) statements. A given
> run of
> the programme will in genreal not explore every branch. yet the
> unexplored
> branches are part of the programme. A branch of an if-then statement
> that is
> not executed on a particular run o
Bruno
I'm absolutely sincere in what I've said about approaching comp in
'as if' mode. But at the same time I've hoped from the beginning
that we could make explicit the choices that motivate our different
ontic starting assumptions. Are there perhaps irreconcilable issues of
style or preference,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
> understanding.
>
>
> >> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> >>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can cla
Let me think aloud,
Plotinus's terms:
Primary Hypostases:
1) the ONE
2) the Divine Intellect
3) the all-soul
Secondary hypostases:
4) Intelligible Matter
5) Sensible Matter
With the UDA, you can already try
Primary Hypostases:
1) truth
2) third person communicable truth
3) firs
Hi Peter,
I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
understanding.
>> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
>>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
>>> the truth of mathematical
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> > > > like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
> > >
> > > It would be a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > > non-branching
> > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency
> > > in general
> > > being due to the fact that we don't know the
Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote:
>> The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I
>> don't
>> think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is.
I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of "internal" or
epistemological existence, build from
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> > > like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
> >
> > It would be a trivial case.
>
> Trivial does not mea
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