Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> [Stathis Papaioannou]
>
>No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
>this
>is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
>characters
>is a translation of any Eng
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
> >>> No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
> >>> this
> >>> is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
> >>> characters
> >>> is a translation of any English sentence of similar or shorter l
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
> >>> No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
> >>> this
> >>> is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
> >>> characters
> >>> is a translation of any English sentence of similar or shorter l
1Z wrote:
> Indeed, but the contingentist doesn't have to regard truth
> as something that exists.
Fair enough, but even the contingentist needs to express herself
intelligibly without recourse to a constant blizzard of scare quotes.
So she still needs something that FAPP corresponds to 'instant
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on
> > the *existence* of an instance of it
> What I mean is that - for a 'thoroughgoing contingentist' -
> 'statements', 'concepts', 'truths', 'referents' and anything else
> whatsoever can exist solely in v
1Z wrote:
> Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on
> the *existence* of an instance of it ?
What I mean is that - for a 'thoroughgoing contingentist' -
'statements', 'concepts', 'truths', 'referents' and anything else
whatsoever can exist solely in virtue of their actual contingen
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David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Statements, concepts and beliefs must
> > be contingently instantiated. That doesn't
> > mean that their truths-values are logially
> > contingent.
> >
>
> I'm not sure that in a world of strictly contingent existence one can
> establish a 'logical necessity'
1Z wrote:
> Statements, concepts and beliefs must
> be contingently instantiated. That doesn't
> mean that their truths-values are logially
> contingent.
>
I'm not sure that in a world of strictly contingent existence one can
establish a 'logical necessity' that is independent of 'contingent
ins
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Necessary truth doesn't entail necessary existence unless
> > the claims in question are claims about existence.
>
> If one claims (which I don't BTW) that something is 'necessarily true'
> *independent of contingent existence* then I think for this to be in
1Z wrote:
> Necessary truth doesn't entail necessary existence unless
> the claims in question are claims about existence.
If one claims (which I don't BTW) that something is 'necessarily true'
*independent of contingent existence* then I think for this to be in
any way coherent, one must be mak
David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Please I have never said that primary matter is impossible. Just that I
> > have no idea what it is, no idea what use can it have, nor any idea how
> > it could helps to explain quanta or qualia.
> > So I am happy that with comp it has necessarily n
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > The requirement that computations require counterfactuals isn't
> > > > ad hoc, it comes from the observation that computer programmes
> > > > include if-then statements.
> >
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Please I have never said that primary matter is impossible. Just that I
> have no idea what it is, no idea what use can it have, nor any idea how
> it could helps to explain quanta or qualia.
> So I am happy that with comp it has necessarily no purpose, and we can
> abandon
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Physical determinism is the idea that the
> > future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical
> > laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed
> > becasue it is already "there", like the end of a movie
> > which is already in t
Le 31-août-06, à 22:20, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Le 29-août-06, à 20:45, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>
>>
>>> The version of AR that is supported by comp
>>> only makes a commitment about mind-independent *truth*. The idea
>>> that the mind-independent truth of mathematical proposition
Le 31-août-06, à 12:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more "free" than
> billiard
> balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free? I have a
> strong feeling
> that my free will is not randomness and not determinism: is there
>
Peter Jones writes:
> > But is there any sense in which we as humans are any more "free" than
> > billiard
> > balls or dice beyond the fact that we *feel* we are free?
>
> There may be. For instance, freedom might be a combination of
> indeterminism and rational self-control.
>
> > I have a st
Peter Jones writes:
> Physical determinism is the idea that the
> future is genrated form the persent by rigid physical
> laws. As opposed to the idea that the future is fixed
> becasue it is already "there", like the end of a movie
> which is already in the can , and need not bear any logical
>
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