RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in rather simple cases, like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it can also be implemented so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5

Re: Russell's book

2006-09-14 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Sep 13, 2006 at 02:56:30PM -, David Nyman wrote: Russell Standish wrote: If you can demonstrate this as a theorem, or even as a moderately convincing argument why this should be so, I'd be most grateful for a presentation. I'm all for eliminating unnecessary hypotheses.

RE: Russell's book

2006-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Johnathan Corgan writes: David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person sense, except by analogy with our own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what can be known by observing an entity and what can be known by being the entity,

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I don't recall anything about all computations implementing consciousness? Brent Meeker OK, this is the basis of our disagreement. I understood computationalism as the idea that it is the actual computation that gives rise to

Re: Russell's book

2006-09-14 Thread Tom Caylor
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: After many life-expectancy-spans worth of narrow escapes, after thousands or millions of years, wouldn't the probability be pretty high for my personality/memory etc. to change so much that I wouldn't recognize myself, or that I could be

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in rather simple cases, like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it can also be implemented so we can interact with it, as when there is

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person sense, except by analogy with our own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what can be known by observing an entity and what can be known

Re: Proof that QTI is false

2006-09-14 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 5:47 AM Subject: Re: Proof that QTI is false Saibal Mitra wrote: QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The observable

Re: Proof that QTI is false

2006-09-14 Thread Saibal Mitra
Yes, I agree that you could still have some form of QTI if there are only a finite number of states. I just don't believe in it, because I don't think the use of the relative measure is justified in case the observer isn't conserved. In all other case the absolute measure and the relative measure