Re: Copying?

2009-02-22 Thread John Mikes
Stephen, you've hit a nerve with *'copying':* ** *Fundamental *questions: *1.WHO *(what) is copying and *HOW*? 2.*INTO* what(?) is copying being done? Then are continuing questions: 3. Does the 'COPY' (to be considerably identical) have identical interconnective circumstances as does the

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009-02-22 Thread John Mikes
Stathis, I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: ...What I find incoherent is the idea that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul cannot be duplicated. If you accept the topic

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. Brent Meeker Original Message Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online

Re: AUDA Page

2009-02-22 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Bruno, will incorporate your changes as soon as time permits :-) Best Wishes, Günther Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Günther, Nice work Günther. Now my comment is longer than I wish. I really would insist on one change. See (**) below. On 16 Feb 2009, at 22:54, Günther Greindl wrote:

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009-02-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/23 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com: Stathis, I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: ...What I find incoherent is the idea that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009-02-22 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Stathis, Bruno, List, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how