2009/2/24 Brent Meeker :
> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
> personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> "observer moments" and "continuity". Almost all my memories are not
> being remembered at an given time. Some I may not reca
Stathis:
two questions.
1.
Why are you breaking your head HOW to copy something we don't believe
'exists' at all? If it aint, don't copy it. Copy what?
2. Are *you* "most of the matter" in your "body"(??) or is there something
more to it? This is exactly my point: if SOMEBODY SOMEHOW is indeed co
On 23 Feb 2009, at 02:21, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Hi Stathis, Bruno, List,
>
>>> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
>>> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
>>> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and
>>> unnameable.
>>> Here computer science
Hi Brent,
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker"
To:
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 12:46 PM
Subject: Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker,
Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
snip
>> Hi Brent and Quentin,
>>
Dear Jonathan, Brent and Stathis,
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker"
To:
Sent: Sunday, February 22, 2009 2:02 AM
Subject: Re: Copying?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> But the brain changes from moment to moment due to chemical reactions
>> and thermal motion and we still
Stephen Paul King wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Brent Meeker"
> To:
> Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A
> Brief Introduction]
>
>
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> If the "copy" has no m
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker"
To:
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM
Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A
Brief Introduction]
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you
>>
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>
>
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it i
2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal
>
>
> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This p
On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for
>> many reasons to the doctor.
>> The copy will not even behave as you.
>> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
>> The copy
Perhaps this paper would be of interest:
Deterministic multivalued logic scheme for information processing and
routing in the brain(arxiv.org/abs/0902.2033)?
Speaking of logic, even though I am not starting from zero,and given
that it is not my full time profession, which papers/book should be
rea
Hi Günther,
Le 22-févr.-09, à 23:16, Günther Greindl a écrit :
> will incorporate your changes as soon as time permits :-)
Take all your time. I am myself rather busy. But thanks for telling me.
Actually I take this AUDA page as an opportunity for thinking about the
best books on Gödel's inco
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