Hi m.a., hi Colin,
On 06 Mar 2009, at 05:07, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
I've often wondered why neither Dr. Deutsch nor Alan
Forrester has commented on your theory of UDA and AUDA. I certainly
would be interested in their views. A theory that has execised some
of the best minds on
2009/3/6 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you
shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one
version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is created
elsewhere in the
At 07:31 AM 3/6/2009, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/6 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you're not worried about the fair trade,
then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried
about the unfair trade either. In the fair
trade, one version of you A disappears
overnight, and
Hi Colin,
the problem is that while the _ideal_ of science is rationality, it is
not yet fully institutionalized (can it ever be?) and people still
harbor a lot of irrationality personally (scientists often have the
strangest beliefs outside their speciality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/3/6 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you're not worried about the fair trade, then to be consistent you
shouldn't be worried about the unfair trade either. In the fair trade, one
version of you A disappears overnight, and a new version of you B is
Which I? Aren't you concerned that you would press the button - and vanish?
Brent
The psychological continuer - the one who remembers having pressed the
button but with +5 dollars on his account.
@Stathis: would you really do this (press the button, also in the
absoute measure scenario)?
Bruno,
My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to
numbers in the first place
But that would violate the comp assumption.
No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of
non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number.
- that is why the
Hi Bruno,
With COMP it is not so clear.
explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the
Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next
instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith.
Please bear in mind that I have not yet
Hi Kim, hi John, hi People,
Kim provided me with an excellent answer to my preceding post (out-of-
line though). And John told me he was impatient to see my definition
of the natural numbers (and some other numbers) in term of sets. So I
make a try. Nothing is important here for the sequel,
Dear Bruno, this is my reply to your SeventhStep-2 post.
Still not clear; Axiom 1 says I is 'a' number, - OK.
Axiom 2 sais x which I understand is general for any number. So xI is
not different from II. The example: (say) I is 2, x=3, xI=32 and your 'II'
is not 'a' number, but two numbers
No. First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility
function is or should be. The real question is whether the measure, M, is
conserved or whether it decreases. It's just that a lot of people don't
understand what that means.
I agree that a lot of people don't
On 06/03/2009, at 11:24 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
- Neither physicists nor logicians really knows about the mind-body
problem. So it is easy to make someone interested in consciousness
looking crazy: just say: this guy is interested on consciousness
(with a grin).
Why does some
2009/3/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
Which I? Aren't you concerned that
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