On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do understand that.
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 11:38 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:07 PM, rmiller wrote:
To me, the M
Hi Bruno,
Well! Perhaps we are closer than I thought but that has
implications of its own…
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 11:25 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:07 PM, rmiller wrote:
> To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in
> frames of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a
> 2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of
> a particular sectio
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the
existence of any 1-p experiential c
To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in frames
of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a
2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of
a particular section of Many Worlds. Now think of a behavior pattern as a
set
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen wrote:
> So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
> However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
> weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of"
> 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be un
On the many-worlds FAQ:
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html
It states that many-worlds implies that worlds split rather than multiple,
identical, pre-existing worlds differentiate:
"Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split?
-
Can we regard the
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> The only rationale for adducing the additional
> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the
> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3
Bruno,
interesting exchange with Stephen.
I have a sideline-question:
why do you 'refer-to' and repeatedly invoke into your ways of your advanced
thinking the NAME (I did not say: concept) of GOD, a noumenon so many times
and many occasions mistreated and misused over the millennia - throughout
th
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
> computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly interested in, with
re
Hi Stephen,
On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P. King wrote:
Nature has repeatedly proven herself to be vastly more
clever than we can imagine. Quantum coherence is used in
photosynthesis by plants to increase the efficiency of photon energy
capture by the use of structures
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