Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-24 Thread Charles
On Feb 23, 8:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: >I think > it's an example of the radiation arrow of time making a time-reversed > process impossible - or maybe just vanishingly improbable.  Bruce Kellet > has written a paper about these problems, see pp 35. > > http://members.optusnet.com.au/bhkellett/ra

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-02-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 25 February 2010 14:46, Charles wrote: > However, I agree that the statement "evolution has programmed us to > think of ourselves as a single individual", etc is rather contentious > as an explanation of why we think this way. It seems to imply that > there are many other ways we *could* think

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-02-24 Thread Charles
On Jan 15, 5:15 pm, Rex Allen wrote: > On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > > wrote: > > > There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you > > mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single > > individual travelling in the forward dire

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-24 Thread Charles
I hope you don't mind if I don't quote the entire exchange, which is now rather long. Unfortunately I only have a short time in which to reply, as well, so excuse the brevity! I was under the impression that Price was NOT arguing for any special kind of retrocausation, but I may have misunderstood

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24 Feb, 16:09, David Nyman wrote: > We would seek unambiguous evidence > that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states, > certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the > hypothesis of 1-p --> 3-p causal influence. In the unlikely event that anyone else

Re: problem of size '10

2010-02-24 Thread Jack Mallah
Last post didn't show up in email. Seems random. --- On Tue, 2/23/10, Jesse Mazer wrote: > -even if there was a one-to-one relationship between distinct computations > and distinct observer-moments with distinct qualia, very similar computations > could produce very similar qualia, Sure. So y

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote: It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard problem. 1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism) OR 2)

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-24 Thread Jesse Mazer
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 12:41 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: > Roger Penrose also devotes chapter 7 of his book "The Emperor's New Mind" > to the topic of "Cosmology and the Arrow of Time" (parts of which can be > viewed at > http://books.google.com/books?id=DNd2K6mxLpIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA506#v=onepage&q=&f=f

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-24 Thread Jesse Mazer
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 1:02 AM, Charles wrote: > > > The point about amplification is that all normal detection events > require amplification, such as photographic film, photomultipliers and > so on. We never detect a quantum event directly, but rather the result > of that event having caused so

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: Rex Allen wrote: The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and unca

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread David Nyman
2010/2/23 Diego Caleiro : Thanks for this. I have to say, though, that Yablo's approach strikes me again as waving-away, or defining-out-of-existence, a real issue that doesn't deserve such treatment. The motive for this seems to be that academic philosophy has become embarrassed by this questio

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread John Mikes
David, please, do not put me down as a Schopenhauerist. My "mini-solipsist" views stem from Colin Hayes' earlier Everything-list posts about "perceived reality" as we MAY know it. I condone the existence (?!) of the world I am part of, just restrict whatever I "CAN" know to the content (and functio

RE: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Stephen P. King
Hi Rex and Members, There is a very compelling body of work in logic that allows for circularity. Please take a look at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/m06t7w0163945350/ and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/ It could make some progress toward the "

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen wrote: > With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by "two undeniably > manifest perpectives." Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's > 1-p. > > My proposal is that "seeming" is all there is to reality. It's all > surface, no depth. However, using