On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z wrote:
> It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
> not equivalent positions, for instance.
> And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch
> of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
> opponents say mind "Is" nothing at all.
On 3/7/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekerwrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>> On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> >> The way I see it th
On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman wrote:
> On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> >>> Reduction is not elimination
>
>
>
> > Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> > *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
>
> Bruno, this is what I wa
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Reduction is not elimination
>>
>
> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why
"ontological
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious o
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
> The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> > world except the virtual world
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
> at all in our terms. It cou
On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:
I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those
of random structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is
irrelevant he
> > I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random
> > structures.
> It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant
here: to predict a concrete individual history, w
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction.
Please read:
Ontological reduction does not necessaril
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no observations without se
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:26, Digital Physics wrote:
You write "white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random
structures. They are aberrant
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams." I agree
that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random
structures.
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
> > consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
>
> There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no observations without sense organs,
but it is not the jo
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:10, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, importa
You write "white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They
are aberrant
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams." I agree that white
rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random structures. But you
also claim that "most will consider their histori
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> I suspect we all may.
>
> Wong states that, important as a gr
On Mar 6, 7:21 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> >> The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> >> > world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
> >> > at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment a
On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:
But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are
random and unpredictable
and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can
we predict rather
reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?
> From: m
But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and
unpredictable
and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict
rather
reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.c
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
"... it
is lacking in one important fundamen
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not
conscious
> at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and
Bru
Hi John,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 22:27, John Mikes wrote:
On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 3:53 PM, Stephen Paul King > wrote:
" Is the "causes" word even necessary? Would it not be accurate to
say that a change in information = a change in our description,
unless you are assuming some sort of plural
John,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 22:10, John Mikes wrote:
Andrew and Bruno:
(Re: Andrew's discussion below): according to what I pretend to
understand of Bruno's position, the "math' universe (numbers and
what they 'build' as the 'world') is more fundamental than the
application we call physic
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