Re: Realism, nominalism and comp

2011-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Sep 2011, at 02:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 5, 1:01 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: May be Mechanism will be refuted, but meanwhile it illustrates that some explanation exists. If mechanism is correct it does explains completely gravity, time, space, quanta, and it

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sep 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Sep 5, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Nothing really new has turned up in the physics underlying the brain in over a century, I'm assuming you're just being thoughtlessly condescending

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sep 6, 3:13 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Sep 2011, at 02:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: When you say that mechanism explains qualia almost completely, are you talking about the 1-p (plural) sequestering of it, the non computability of it, or is there something else? Does

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Sep 2011, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 6, 3:13 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Sep 2011, at 02:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: When you say that mechanism explains qualia almost completely, are you talking about the 1-p (plural) sequestering of it, the non

Re: Realism, nominalism and comp

2011-09-06 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi
Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person view? Evgenii On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are

Re: Realism, nominalism and comp

2011-09-06 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi
I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the

Re: Realism, nominalism and comp

2011-09-06 Thread meekerdb
On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sep 6, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Sep 2011, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 6, 3:13 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Sep 2011, at 02:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: When you say that mechanism explains qualia almost completely, are you

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread meekerdb
On 9/6/2011 1:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 6, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Sep 2011, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sep 6, 3:13 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Sep 2011, at 02:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: When you say that mechanism

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sep 6, 5:02 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/6/2011 1:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Absent qualia, and vanishing sensations already occurs in many consciousness pathologies, in general due to brain troubles, like with Alzheimer. Right, but the human sensations do not seem

Re: bruno list

2011-09-06 Thread meekerdb
On 9/6/2011 5:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: If all bodies are computations, then what's the difference? You're just being obtuse. All bodies are composed of atoms, so what's the difference between them. Brent If you say we are not our bodies, you can only be saying that we are not our