“Markov's theorem

Hi Bruno and Russell, This is one of the reasons I am skeptical of Bruno's immaterialism: http://www.mathnet.ru/php/archive.phtml?wshow=paper&jrnid=im&paperid=471&option_lang=eng Markov's theorem and algorithmically non-recognizable combinatorial manifolds M. A. Shtan'ko

Re: Free will in MWI

On Sat, May 19, 2012 at 1:03 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> You haven't understood a basic point, which is important independently >> of the current discussion. This point is that if we live in a >> perfectly deterministic multiverse, our subjective experience will be >> probabilistic. This is beca

Re: Free will in MWI

On Thu, May 17, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > They [computers] won't EVER discover a printer that is sitting right next > to them without having drivers loaded and configured And you won't EVER discover a printer sitting right next to you if you had no eyes or hands. > Did the reason

Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?

Colin, you always have something extraordinary and unexpectable to say. Like: "infinity of energy" what can be easily zero as well, of something (- currently unidentified.) It still leaves open my quale: 'nothing must not have borders either, (that would be a NO-nothing) so as far as our (incomplet

Re: Free will in MWI

On May 18, 10:44 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Wed, May 16, 2012 at 10:34 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: > > I don't think you understand what I understand. Of course the > > limitation of the 1p view excludes information relative to a 3p view, > > but the reverse is true as well. Indetermini

Re: Free will in MWI

On Wed, May 16, 2012 at 10:34 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > I don't think you understand what I understand. Of course the > limitation of the 1p view excludes information relative to a 3p view, > but the reverse is true as well. Indeterminism emerges as a third > person phenomenon in that subjectiv