On Thu, Nov 22, 2012 at 11:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>John Clark keeps saying that after the duplication John Clark will be in
>> both places.
>
>
> > Not from its personal subjective view (1p).
>
Pronouns are Bruno Marchal's crutch and now "it" joins the pantheon.
> >> Where subjectiv
Dear Friends,
In my research for my earlier post (Re: Nothing happens in the
Universe of the Everett Interpretation) I found the following:
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hierarchy_of_beliefs
Hierarchy of beliefs
"Construction by Jean-François Mertens and Zamir implementing with John
On 11/22/2012 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun
On 22 Nov 2012, at 15:55, John Clark wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ?
!
> by comp you know that you will survive and feel to be unique in
once city,
By comp who knows that what will survive and feel to be unique in
one city?
Any human (and Löbian machine) can understand that if comp
Hi Roger,
On 22 Nov 2012, at 13:57, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno
Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence
between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with
the computer in order for comp to hold ?
You don't need a "perfect" correspondence. What would t
On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P
Hi Roger,
On 22 Nov 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say
" OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like
Penrose and Lucas did."
So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory
It is not a theory.
It is an informal argument according
Roger,
Since comp is consistent with MWI and MWI is deterministic,
then the computer does know the future.
IMO for comp to be false, MWI must also be false.
Richard
On Thu, Nov 22, 2012 at 7:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno
>
> Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspon
Hi Bruno
Wouldn't there have to be a pre-established perfect correspondence
between the mind of the human (or the state of the world) with
the computer in order for comp to hold ?
But that would require the computer to know the future.
Hence comp is false.
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say
" OK, but invalid when used to pretend that we are not machine, like
Godel and Lucas did."
So basically, whether you believe the Lucas-Penrose theory depends
on whether you believe in comp or no. I have serious problems
with comp because the 1ps and hence the 3ps of v
On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 8:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi
>
> I was wrong.
>
> According to my own definition of intelligence-- that it is the
> ability of an entity, having at least some measure of free will,
> to make choices on its own (without outside help)-- a
> computer can have intelligen
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