RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that! On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales mailto:cgha...@unimelb.edu.au>> wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289 Daniel C. Dennett<http://www.edge.org/memberbio/daniel_c_dennet

RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289 Daniel C. Dennett Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps And again Cheers Niloc -- You received

RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25336 Rodney A. Brooks Roboticist; Panasonic Professor of Robotics (emeritus) , MIT; Founder, Chairman & CTO, Rethink Robotics; Author, Flesh and Machines While we're at it Lots of good stuff in these respons

Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer "Science"

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 Neil Gershenfeld Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 ye

RE: Tegmark and consciousness

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Sunday, 12 January 2014 5:54 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness On 1/11/2014 8:12 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1

RE: Tegmark and consciousness

RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014 Consciousness as a State of Matter Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014 Hi Folk, Grrr! I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science's grapplings with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive and

RE: Atheism is wish fulfillment

Religion? There's a Tim Minchin video for that. It'll cure you. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kr1I3mBojc0 or maybe http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZeWPScnolo cheers colin -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of m

RE: Why do particles decay randomly?

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou Sent: Friday, 12 April 2013 11:30 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why do particles decay randomly? On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, C

RE: Why do particles decay randomly?

Colin's Wackier Version: Because the space they operate in, at the scale in which the decay operates, there are far more dimensions than 3. They decay deterministically in >>3D and it appears, to us, to be random because of the collapse of the spatial dimensions to 3, where we humble observers

I am the de-phlogistonator!

Hi, Hales, C. G. 2012 The modern phlogiston: why 'thinking machines' don't need computers TheConversation. The Conversation media Group. http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881 Cheers Colin P.S. I am done with this issue. I'

RE: Church Turing be dammed.

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed. On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales mailto:cgha

Church Turing be dammed.

Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body

RE: Why is there something rather than nothing?

Why didn't you just ask me in the first place? It's easy. "Nothing" (noun) is intrinsically unstable. Think about it. It takes an infinity of energy to maintain a perfect Nothing. So Nothing breaks up into its components. There. You can all rest easy now. Cheers Colin -Original Message-

Poking the bear.

Hi all, You might be interested in a little article I wrote, published here: http://theconversation.edu.au/learning-experience-lets-take-consciousness-in-from-the-cold-6739 I am embarked on the long process of getting science to self-review. Enjoy! Colin -- You received this message because

RE: IBM produces first 'brain chips'

[Col] I've just had a whole bunch of fun at the Melbourne Singularity Summit. What a 'hoot'! At the conference I made a somewhat thwarted attempt to introduce physical replication as a 'roadmap item' for AGI. I tried to show that AGI may be reached by constructing the actual necessary physics of

RE: Turing Machines

On 8/15/2011 7:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: just like you can simulate flight if you simulate the environment you are flying in. But do we need to simulate the entire atmosphere in order to simulate flight, or just the atmosphere in the immediate area around the surfaces of the plane?

RE: Turing Machines

On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 2:06 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Read all your commentscutting/snipping to the chase... It is a little unfortunate you did not answer all of the questions. I hope that you will answer both questions (1) and (2) below. Yeah sorry about that... I'm r

RE: Turing Machines

Read all your commentscutting/snipping to the chase... [Jason ] Your belief that AGI is impossible to achieve through computers depends on at least one of the following propositions being true: 1. Accurate simulation of the chemistry or physics underlying the brain is impossible 2. Human in

RE: Turing Machines

Colin and Craig, Imagine that God has such a machine on his desk, which he uses to compute the updated positions of each particle in some universe over each unit of Planck time. Would you agree it is possible for the following to occur in the simulation: 1. Stars to coalesce due to gravity and

RE: Turing Machines

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg Sent: Monday, 15 August 2011 10:07 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: Turing Machines On Aug 14, 7:29 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Great video ..

RE: Turing Machines

Great video ... a picture of simplicity Q. 'What is it like to be a Turing Machine?" = Hard Problem. A. It's like being the pile of gear in the video, NO MATTER WHAT IS ON THE TAPE. Colin From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf

SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011, Melbourne Australia

‘THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY’ SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011 AUGUST 20-21 RMIT UNIVERSITY Melbourne http://summit.singinst.org.au/ This August, leading scientists, inventors and philosophers will gather in Melbourne to discuss the upcoming ‘intelligence explosion’ that many now refer to as ‘The Singul

RE: Simulated Brains

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jesse Mazer Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 3:26 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Simulated Brains On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen

RE: Simulated Brains

A computed theory of a hurricane is not a hurricane. A computed theory of cognition is not cognition. We don't want a simulation of the thing. We want an instance of the thing. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf O

RE: bruno list

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg Sent: Monday, 25 July 2011 11:31 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: bruno list On Jul 24, 9:02 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > artificially. i.e. REPLICATE. Not emulate. Not simulate. You master the > natural vers

RE: bruno list

-Original Message- From: On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg Sent: Monday, 25 July 2011 10:43 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: bruno list On Jul 24, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Craig, I agree with 1Z, it is hard to comment some of your statements > because we don't know what are the assu

RE: COMP refutation GAME OVER

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Monday, 11 July 2011 1:16 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales

RE: COMP refutation GAME OVER

Hi Bruno et.al. Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation. (A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on some abstract mega-turing machine) (B) I speak of computation _OF_ laws of nature, by a computer made of natural material, where the laws of nature are tho

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Colin Geoffrey Hales Sent: Sun 7/10/2011 4:44 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Bruno Marchal Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 10:14 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On 09 Jul 2011, at 07:07, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Down the bottom if

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Hi, > > > > You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling > it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial > central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi, You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action potentials mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field system in ext

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi, You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial central nervous system are doing things. Yes, they are passing signals back and forth, performing additions, multiplications, and comp

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Thursday, 7 July 2011 4:16 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 10:22 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi Richard et. al., Wow that thread just keeps on going! I am designing chips that do what the brain does. There is ZERO computing. The use of the chips is, I believe a viable source of empirical verification of the claims of the kind that have been discussed in this thread, insofar as any practic

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen Sent: Monday, 27 June 2011 1:58 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 11:29 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Can I recalibrate this a little so that you can scientifically handle > consciousness? > > 1) science is based on observation. > > 2) scientific 'observation' is 100% implemented by the consciousness of > scientists. > > 3) regular

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen Sent: Monday, 27 June 2011 5:59 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno

RE: computer pain

> > Colin, > > You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can > be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the > response > to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel > situation > if it is simply described to me. I don't have to

RE: computer pain

Stahis said: > If you present an object with "identical sensory measurements" but get different results in the chip, then that means what you took as "sensory measurements" was incomplete. For example, blind people might be able to sense the presense of someone who silently walks into the room du

RE: computer pain

Stathis said <> > and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. > Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person > experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; > and the latter can only be

RE: computer pain

Stathis said > > I'll let Colin answer, but it seems to me he must say that some aspect of > brain > physics deviates from what the equations tell us (and deviates in an > unpredictable > way, otherwise it would just mean that different equations are required) > to be > consistent. If not, the

RE: computer pain

> > I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most > direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just > that physical process > which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an > appropriately > brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce

RE: computer pain

> > I understand your conclusion, that a model of a brain > won't be able to handle novelty like a real brain, > but I am trying to understand the nuts and > bolts of how the model is going to fail. For > example, you can say that perpetual motion > machines are impossible because they disobey > t

Re: computer pain

> > So the EM fields account for the experiences that accompany the brain processes. A kind of epiphenomena. > > So why don't my experiences change when I'm in an MRI? > I haven't been through the detail - I hope to verify this in my simulations to come but... As far as I am aware MRI magne

Re: computer pain

> > So your theory is that the electromagnetic field has an ability to learn which is not reflected in QED - it's some hitherto unknown aspect of the field and it doesn't show up in the field violating Maxwell's equations or > QED predictions? And further this aspect of the EM field is able to ef

RE: computer pain

Stathis wrote: I can understand that, for example, a computer simulation of a storm is not a storm, because only a storm is a storm and will get you wet. But perhaps counterintuitively, a model of a brain can be closer to the real thing than a model of a storm. We don't normally see inside a perso

Re: computer pain

Brent said: > Of course they describe things - they aren't the things themselves. > But the question is whether the description is complete. Is there > anything about EM fields that is not described by QED? Absolutely HEAPS! Everything that they are made of and how the components inteact to mak

RE: computer pain

> > So you are saying the special something which causes > consciousness and which functionalism has ignored > is the electric field around the neuron/astrocyte. > But electric fields were well understood even a > hundred years ago, weren't they? Why couldn't > a neuron be simulated by something l

RE: computer pain

Hi Stathis, RE: Zombie Room The zombie room is now in a paper on solipsism and is in review and I expect will be rejected in due course! :-) Over XMAS I hope to catch up on all my mail. It's proven to be a really useful cross-modal thought experiment because it renders a human 'methodologically z

RE: computer pain

Hi Stathis/Jamie et al. I've been busy else where in self-preservation mode deleting emails madly .frustrating, with so many threads left hanging...oh well...but I couldn't go past this particular dialog. I am having trouble that you actually believe the below to be the case! Lines of cod

MIT debate (Making Marvins or Zombie Rooms?)

I thought I'd pass this on from another group Maybe one of us who is local can go along? Damn I wish I was there... :-) -- Here is a debate this Thursday at MIT on a really big question: Creativity: the mind, machines, and mathematics A Celebra

Re: The Totally Blind Zombie Homunculus Room

> > Le Mardi 28 Novembre 2006 21:47, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : >> All your comments are shooting from hip without actually reading and >> thinking. They are all of the class "> isn;t like that" when the point is that the circumstances are needed to >> dem

Re: The Totally Blind Zombie Homunculus Room

see the end > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> This discussion is a hybrid of a number of very famous thought >> experiments. Unlike those thought experiments, however, this experiment >> is >> aimed purely and only at scientists. The intent is to demonstrate >

RE: UDA revisited

>> the basic assumption of BIV I would see as flawed. It assumes that all >> there is to the scene genreation is what there is at the boundary where >> the sense measurement occurs. >> >> Virtual reality works, I think, because in the end, actual photons fly >> at >> you from outside. Actual phono

Re: UDA revisited

> > Do you mean you can have exact human external behavior replica without > consciousness ? or with a different consciousness (than a human) ? > > If 1st case then if you can't find any difference between a real human and > the > replica lacking consciousness how could you tell the replica is lac

RE: UDA revisited and then some

> > > Quentin Anciaux writes: > >> But the point is to assume this "nonsense" to take a "conclusion", to >> see >> where it leads. Why imagine a "possible" zombie which is functionnally >> identical if there weren't any dualistic view in the first place ! Only >> in >> dualistic framework it is po

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> "If the mind is what the brain does, then what exactly is a coffee cup >> doing?" > > It's not mind-ing. > >> For that question is just as valid and has just as complex an >> answer... > > Of course not. > >> .yet we do not ask it. Every object in the universe is like this. >> This is the m

RE: UDA revisited

> The hard problem is not that we haven't discovered the physics that > explains > consciousness, it is that no such explanation is possible. Whatever > Physics X > is, it is still possible to ask, "Yes, but how can a blind man who > understands > Physics X use it to know what it is like to see?"

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> The very fact that the laws of physics, derived and validated using >> phenomenality, cannot predict or explain how appearances are generated >> is >> proof that the appearance generator is made of something else and that >> something else else is the reality involve

The Totally Blind Zombie Homunculus Room

This discussion is a hybrid of a number of very famous thought experiments. Unlike those thought experiments, however, this experiment is aimed purely and only at scientists. The intent is to demonstrate clearly and definitively the nature of subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness) and it

RE: UDA revisited

> > Of course they are analogue devices, but their analogue nature makes no > difference to the computation. If the ripple in the power supply of a TTL > circuit were >4 volts then the computer's true analogue nature would > intrude and it would malfunction. > > Stathis Papaioannou Of course you

Re: UDA revisited

The discussion has run its course. It has taught me a lot about the sorts of issues and mindsets involved. It has also given me the idea for the methodological-zombie-room, which I will now write up. Maybe it will depict the circumstances and role of phenomenality better than I have thus far. Me

Re: UDA revisited

That's it. Half the laws of physics are going neglected merely because we won't accept phenomenal consciousness ITSELF as evidence of anything. >>> We accept it as evidence of extremely complex neural activity - can you >>> demonstrate it is not? >> >> You have missed the point agai

Re: UDA revisited

Everything in this weve been through already. All my answers are already in. > > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> >> Colin >> >> I'm not talking about invisibility of within a perceptual field. That >> is >> >> an invisibility humans can

Re: UDA revisited

> > Le Dimanche 26 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : > >> What point is there in bothering with it. The philosophical zombie is >> ASSUMED to be equivalent! This is failure before you even start! It's >> wrong and it's proven wrong beca

Re: UDA revisited

> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> <> >>>> No confusion at all. The zombie is behaving. 'Wide awake' >>>> in the sense that it is fully functional. >>> Well, adaptive behaviour -- dealing with novelty --- is functioning. >> >&g

Re: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> >> Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly >> >> identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that >> >> phenomenality is necessary...see below... >> > &

Re: UDA revisited

> > What the zombie argument says (and I repeat it again) is that you SHOULD > (if you are an honest rational person) accept ONE (and only > one as they are contradictory proposition) of the following propositions: > > 1) Consciousness is not tied to a given behavior nor to a given physical > attr

Re: UDA revisited

> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >>> But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a >>> particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery >>> property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're goin

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> You are a zombie. What is it about sensory data that suggests an >> external world? > > What is it about sensory data that suggests an external world to > human? Nothing. That's the point. That's why we incorporate the usage of natural world properties to contextualise it in the external wo

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> Absolutely! But the humans have phenomenal consciousness in lieu of ESP, >> which the zombies do not. > > PC doesn't magically solve the problem.It just involves a more > sophisticated form of guesswork. It can be fooled. We been here before and I'll say it again if I have to Yes! It c

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> Except that in time, as people realise what I just said above, the >> hypothesis has some emprical support: If the universe were made of >> appearances when we opened up a cranium we'd see them. We don't. > > Or appearances don't appear to be appearances to a third party. > Precisely. Now a

Re: UDA revisited

<> >> No confusion at all. The zombie is behaving. 'Wide awake' >> in the sense that it is fully functional. > > Well, adaptive behaviour -- dealing with novelty --- is functioning. Yes - but I'm not talking about merely functioning. I am talking about the specialised function called scientific b

RE: UDA revisited

Stathis: > > See my previous post, I'm also answering them in the order that I read > them > (otherwise I'll never get back to them). > > If your model is adequate, then it should allow you to implement a replica > of what > it is that you're modelling such that the replica behaves the same as the

RE: UDA revisited

> > You seem to be implying that there is some special physics > involved in living processes: isn't that skimming a little > close to vitalism?. All I see is the chemistry > of large organic molecules, the fundamentals of which are > well understood, even if the level of complexity is beyond > wh

Re: UDA revisited

> > But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a > particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery > property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're going > around in circles. At some point you need to anchor your theory to an > operati

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> You are a zombie. What is it about sensory data that suggests an >> external world? The science you can do is the science of >> zombie sense data, not an external world. Your hypotheses >> about an external world would be treated >> as wild metaphysics by your zombie

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> > You're being unfair to the poor zombie robots. How could they >> > possibly tell if they were in the factory or on the benchtop >> > when the benchtop (presumably) exactly replicates the sensory >> > feeds they would receive in the factory? >> > Neither humans nor

Re: UDA revisited

>> Colin >> I'm not talking about invisibility of within a perceptual field. That is >> an invisibility humans can deal with to some extent using instruments. >> We >> inherit the limits of that process, but at least we have something >> presented to us from the outside world. The invisibility I s

Re: UDA revisited

>> Stathis: >> > All I have to work on is sensory data also. >> >> No you don't! You have an entire separate set of perceptual/experiential >> fields constructed from sensory feeds. The fact of this is proven - >> think >> of hallucination. When the senory data gets overidden by the internal >> im

Re: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> > >> > You don't think paramecium behaviour could be modelled on a computer? >> > >> > Stathis Papaiaonnou >> >> A paramecium can behave like it's perceiving something. I haven't >>

Re: UDA revisited

> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > >> BTW there's no such thing as a truly digital computer. They are all >> actually analogue. We just ignore the analogue parts of the state >> transitions and time it all so it makes sense. > > And if the analogue part intrudes,

Re: UDA revisited

>> Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly >> identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that >> phenomenality is necessary...see below... > > It is all to easy to consider scientific behaviour without > phenomenality. > Scientist looks at test-tube

Re: UDA revisited

<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Le 24-nov.-06, ࠰5:48, Colin Geoffrey Hales a dit : > >> I agree very 'not interesting' ... a bit like saying "assuming comp" endlessly.and never being able to give it teeth. > > I gues

Re: UDA revisited

> Le 25-nov.-06, ࠰2:38, Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it : > >> [A zombie] doesn't even know there is a world to do science on. > > > *we* don't *know* either. (Even if it is highly dubious there is no world at all, but that is resting on a pure, strictly speaking not t

RE: UDA revisited

Ooops...I forgot the 'quantum level' issue in the paramecium discussion. No. I would disagree. Quantum mechanics is just another "law of appearances" - how the world appears when we look. The universe is not made of quantum mechanics. It is made of 'something'. That 'something' is behaving quantu

RE: UDA revisited

>> Also...paramecium is not noted for its >> scientific behaviour! > > The computer driving the paramecium shell might be difficult > to build, but in principle it would be the same sort of task as, say, a computer running an analogue clock or projecting a film > (i.e., originally filmed on a cel

Richard Dawkins..... Douglas Adams' Bulldog

Hereby named by yours truly in honour of Huxley's similar canine representation of Darwin. Richard Dawkins radio program: http://www.abc.net.au/rn/backgroundbriefing/default.htm see also... http://www.abc.net.au/rn/encounter/default.htm on the design argument. cheers Colin Hales --~--~

Re: UDA revisited

> a) Darwinian evolution b) genetic learning algorithm. None of which have any innate capacity to launch or generate phenomenal consciousness and BOTH of which have to be installed by humans a-priori. When you don;t have either of that then what do you do? You are constantly assuming the existan

RE: UDA revisited

Stathis, I am answering all the mail in time order. I can see below you are making some progress! This is cool. > Colin Hales writes: >> >> So, I have my zombie scientist and my human scientist and >> >> I ask them to do science on exquisite novelty. What happens? >> >> The novelty is invisible t

RE: UDA revisited

>> >> soyes the zombie can 'behave'. What I am claiming is they >> cannot do _science_ i.e. they cannot behave scientifically. >> This is a very specific claim, not a general claim. > > You're being unfair to the poor zombie robots. How could they > possibly tell if they were in the factory or

Re: UDA revisited

>> If all you have is a bunch of numbers (or 4-20mA current loop >> signals or 1-5V signals) dancing away, and you have no >> a-priori knowledge of the external world, how are you to >> create any sort of model of the external world in the first >> place? You don't even know it is there. That is t

Re: UDA revisited

>> > > I understand that there is a difference between sensing and perception. > Perception includes sensing and also interpreting the sensations in a > model of the world. Which is why unusual appearances can literally be > difficult to perceive. But you still have not said why a digital comput

Re: UDA revisited

The "PHENOMENAL" Colin > What I have done is try to figure out a valid test for phenomenal > consciousness. Brent What is the functional definition of "phenomenal"? Is there "non-phenomenal consciousness"? Colin Phenomena are things that happen in the universe. Those things are perceived by hum

Re: UDA revisited

Colin >That is the invisibility I claim at the center of > the zombie's difficulty. Brent But it will also present the same difficulty to the human scientist. An in fact it is easy to build a robot that detects and responds to radio waves that are completely invisible to a human scientist. Coli

Re: UDA revisited

Colin > I am not talking about the creative process. I am talking about the > perception of a natural world phenomena that has never before been > encountered. There can be no a-priori scientific knowledge in such > situations. It is as far from a metaphor as you can get. I mean literal > invisibi

Re: UDA revisited

Colin: > When you take away phenomenal consciousness what can't you do? Brent: I don't know, because I don't know what it is. What it is? ..is what changes radically when you close your eyes. ..is what you lose when you have a dreamless sleep. ..is what totally stops you doing science when it's

RE: UDA revisited

> > You don't think paramecium behaviour could be modelled on a computer? > > Stathis Papaiaonnou A paramecium can behave like it's perceiving something. I haven't observed it myself but I have spoken to people who have and they say they have behaviours which betray some sort of awareness beyond

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> So, I have my zombie scientist and my human scientist and >> I ask them to do science on exquisite novelty. What happens? >> The novelty is invisible to the zombie, who has the internal >> life of a dreamless sleep. The reason it is invisible is >> because there is n

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