Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-08-02 Thread David Nyman
> At this stage you should try to be specific about the reasons why an > hardware independent isomorphism cannot exist, or perhaps you are > just saying that "first person feeling" would not be genuine if they > were not related to some 'physical reality' in which case I could > agree I feel we'r

Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-07-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 29-juil.-06, à 18:23, David Nyman a écrit : > "No doctor!" Or rather, it depends what you mean by 'what really > describes me'. What I have argued is that, at the 'physical' level of > description, running a hardware-independent computation could never > 'really describe me' in one of the m

Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-07-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 28-juil.-06, à 22:15, David Nyman a écrit : > In your comments above you refer to Platonism. It seems clear that if > we are to regard mathematics or comp as having the kind of 'efficacy' > (sorry, but what word would you prefer?), then we must indeed grant > them some sort of Platonic ind

Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-07-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 27-juil.-06, à 03:21, David Nyman a écrit : >> Mmmmhh This sounds a little bit too much idealist for me. Numbers >> exist with some logic-mathematical priority, and then self-intimacy >> should emerge from many complex relations among numbers. Also, the >> many >> universes (both with co

Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-07-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 24-juil.-06, à 04:23, David Nyman a écrit : >> Bruno: And this is perhaps the very root of a possible disagreement. >> I would >> not compare "mathematical" with "tautological", nor with >> "conventional". This should be clear after the Godelian fall of >> logicism. We know today that even

Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-07-22 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to > Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing > emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even "local nature". I don't see why. The idea that computation can't lead to what you

Re: Emotions (was: Indeterminism

2006-07-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even "local nature". Why not? I find this a bit speculative, and I am interested more in the consequence of the