This reply is a little stale, but here goes anyway:
Marchal wrote: > > George Levy wrote: > > >In a message dated 99-06-30 11:20:07 EDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > > ><< Precisely: Maudlin and me have proved that: > > > > NOT comp OR NOT sup-phys > > > > i.e. computationalism and physical supervenience thesis are incompatible. >> > > > >Forgive me for I am only a lowly engineer. Does the above mean that > >according > >to Marchal and Maudlin consciousness is either due to "software" or > >"hardware" but not both? Using these terms would make it much easier for me > >to understand. > > Put in these termes + simplifying a bit, > what Maudlin and me have showed is that > > EITHER the appearance of hardware and consciousness > is explain(able) by the theory of possible softwares (computer science, > ...) > > OR the computationalist hypothesis is false. > > That is why I ask for, ultimately, a serious consideration on Church's > thesis. > Please explain this, if you have time. I'm sorry if you've already given more detail in other posts, perhaps you could point me to the archives. What exactly is "the computationalist hypothesis"? I gather from the above that "the physical supervenience thesis" has something to do with explaining consciousness as a software program, but I'm confused. I would have *guessed* that that is the "computationalist hypothesis", but you say that those are incompatible, so it can't be. Anyway, Bruno, when I read your posts, I must admit that I feel completely ignorant. I'm coming to this list as a software engineer who happens to have taken a little bit of QM, but I don't know anything about these heady issues of the mathematically rigorous computationalist theory (hell, I don't even know what to call it). Could you suggest any introductory textbooks on this topic? I am definitely convinced that your (and others on and off this list) approach is a valid and powerful technique for exploring these issues. Thanks! -- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com "Knowledge is good" -- Emil Faber