On 28 May 2012, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On May 28, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In first person, space is figurative and time is literal.
Why?
The split between interior significance (doing*being)(timespace) and
exterior entropy (matter/energy)/spacetime
On 28.05.2012 22:42 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 28 May 2012, at 21:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Bruno,
I believe that this time I could say that you express your
position. For example in your two answers below it does not look
like I don't defend that position.
I don't think so. I
On 27.05.2012 23:04 Stephen P. King said the following:
On 5/27/2012 4:07 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
A good extension. Velmans does not consider such a case but he says
that the perceptions are located exactly where one perceives them.
In this case, it seems that it should not pose an
On May 28, 4:55 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In first person, space is figurative and time is literal.
Why?
The split between interior significance (doing*being)(timespace) and
exterior entropy (matter/energy)/spacetime prefigures causality.
Causality is part of 'doing', a
Bruno,
I believe that this time I could say that you express your position. For
example in your two answers below it does not look like I don't defend
that position.
On 28.05.2012 10:55 Bruno Marchal said the following:
I comment on both Evgenii and Craig's comment:
On May 26, 11:57 am,
Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard
Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens-Evgenii
Rudnyi
I conjecture that the discrete nonphysical particles of compactified space,
the so-called Calabi-Yau Manifolds of string theory, have perceptual
On 5/27/2012 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the mind/consciousness of the
observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull but ranging out to
the farthest place where something is percieved. It seems to me that
On May 27, 5:45 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 5/27/2012 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the
mind/consciousness of the
observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull but
ranging out to
the
I have just finished reading Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans
and below there are a couple of comments to the book.
The book is similar to Jeffrey Gray's Consciousness: Creeping up on the
Hard Problem in a sense that it takes phenomenal consciousness
seriously. Let me give an
On 5/26/2012 11:57 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
I have just finished reading Understanding Consciousness by Max
Velmans and below there are a couple of comments to the book.
The book is similar to Jeffrey Gray's Consciousness: Creeping up on
the Hard Problem in a sense that it takes phenomenal
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