Russell Standish wrote:
>Interesting, although I suspect the interpretation of "the ability to
>do something completely stupid" is more like asserting the truth of
>an unprovable statement than asserting the truth of a false
>statement. In modal logic, this would be (x & -[]x ) n'est-ce pas?
Interesting, although I suspect the interpretation of "the ability to
do somehthing completely stupid" is more like asserting the truth of
an unprovable statement than asserting the truth of a false
statement. In modal logic, this would be (x & -[]x ) n'est-ce pas?
Note an automaton cannot asser
these
underlying processes.
Charles
> -Original Message-
> From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 24 October 2001 9:34 a.m.
> To: rwas
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability
>
>
> Whatev
Whatever free will is, it is very doubtful that it depends on
consciousness. See Daniel Dennett's dicussion of the Grey Walter carousel
experiment. This experiment shows (although there is a little ambiguity
left) that free will decisions occure *before* on is conscious of them.
Brent Meeker
George Levy wrote:
> Pete Carlton wrote:
> >
> >
> > George Levy wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Free will is also relativistic. A consciousness gives the impression of
> > > having free will if its behavior is unpredicatble (ineffable -
> > > unprovable) BY THE OBSERVER. The self gives the impression to
Pete Carlton wrote:
> Hi all,
> I've been lurking for months and am continually amazed by the discussions
> going on - I got into this list after branching out from philosophy of
> mind, after something like the GP/UDA (though completely lacking in
> rigor) had surfaced in a discussion I was in a
Russell Standish wrote:
>As I am bound to paraphrase, Free Will is the ability to do somehthing
>completely stupid!
Would you accept:
Freedom is the right to deny 2 + 2 = 5.
(cf. George Orwell torture scene in 1984)
Free Will is the right to say 2 + 2 = 5
(cf. Russell Standish) ?
George Levy wrote
>Free will stems from perceived indeterminacy in the behavior of a person
>or a program. This indeterminacy could either be physical in nature
>(quantics) or mathematical (Godelian). I believe that both physical
>indeterminacy and mathematical indeterminacy will eventually be p
As I am bound to paraphrase, Free Will is the ability to do somehthing
completely stupid!
George Levy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Now let's look at observing free will in the self. Do we perceive
> ourselves to be indeterminate in our behavior? Absolutely sometimes.
> When the decision is clear then fre
Pete Carlton wrote:
>
>
> George Levy wrote:
>
> >
> > Free will is also relativistic. A consciousness gives the impression of
> > having free will if its behavior is unpredicatble (ineffable -
> > unprovable) BY THE OBSERVER. The self gives the impression to the
> > OBSERVING SELF of having
Hi all,
I've been lurking for months and am continually amazed by the discussions
going on - I got into this list after branching out from philosophy of
mind, after something like the GP/UDA (though completely lacking in
rigor) had surfaced in a discussion I was in about artificial intelligence..
rwas wrote:
>
> --- Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> > >On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
> > >> You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like
> > if
> > >> it was
> > >> obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only
> > appea
--- Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> >On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
> >> You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like
> if
> >> it was
> >> obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only
> appears
> >> in Aristote mind when he
Brent Meeker wrote:
>On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
>> You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if
>> it was
>> obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears
>> in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible
>> ideas.
>> (M
Zbigniew Motyka wrote:
>[...]
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal
>
>It would be not polite from my side to express any opinion about UDA before
>I really make acquaintance with it.
Thanks. I whish everyone were like you :-)
>For now I may only repeat: When you start from some suitable axio
On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
> You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if
> it was
> obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears
> in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible
> ideas.
> (My opinion!). Despite the form
Zbigniew Motyka wrote:
>Marchal wrote:[[[EMAIL PROTECTED]] ->Re: Free
>will/consciousness/ineffability, 01-10-01(see below)]:
>
>>I don't believe in matter (personal opinion)
>>Comp is incompatible (in some sense) with existing matter (my thesis).
>(...)
>
>>I agree and that is why I believe t
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