Hi Bruno,
Well! Perhaps we are closer than I thought but that has
implications of its own…
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 11:25 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Does the plants quantum computations?
Hi Stephen,
On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P. King wrote:
snip
I like that it does not ignore consciousness as it puts logic in its core
notions, but there still something missing. There is no necessity for there
to be the phenomena of a physical world evolving in time in Comp.
[BM]
You worried me, but I see you just have not yet seen the point. It is OK.
It is a very subtle point, where "Aristotelians" can have some difficulties.
Actually, recently an expert on Aristotle confirmed my feeling (after my
reading of Aristotle and Plotinus), that Aristotle got that "subtle point",
and that Plotinus found indeed the most plausible correction of Aristotle
theory of Matter coherent with the Plato type of "reality/truth/God".
Matter is no more an epiphenomenon than consciousness. If you really insist
to see an epiphenomenon in comp, you may say that it is the whole coupling
matter/consciousness which is an epiphenomenon bearing on the number
theoretical relations.
[SPK]
Wait, are you saying that both matter and Mind are
epiphenomena?! This is where, again, I recall my post asking how mere
existence of Forms is sufficient to allow for that with is, at least for
1-p, unassailable. As I see it a neutral monism is preferable, but this
would require that mater and mind are aspects that only can obtain when the
possibility of distinguishing them from each other obtains.
***
Not only comp preserves and give a role to consciousness, but it preserves
the interaction of mind and matter. And this in the usual two way
directions.
**
[SPK]
Causality has an arrow pointing in one direction and logical
precedent in the opposite. This is one of V. Pratt’s ideas with Chu Space
construction. But note that his idea only works with a tacit assumption of
an underlying process and it is “process” per say that I would like to
understand how is allowed in any form of Platonism. AFAIK, Platonism assumes
Being as a primitive and becoming is taken as an illusion, thus all things
that are transitory are deemed to be lesser and even evil in Plato’s eyes.
Maybe Plato and Cantor and You should have a chat. There is a relationship
between Infinities and Finities that needs to be considered, a relationship
that need not be taken as one supervening on the other. Within infinities
one finds the notion of making distinctions to be very difficult, even
impossible, thus the problem of the measure.
**
You can define a cosmos, or a cosmic history, by a set of "events" and their
closure for matter-matter interactions, and those are very solid, given that
they sum up the whole (sigma_1) arithmetical truth "everywhere".
You can define an accessible multiverse, by the the closure mind-matter
interaction, this extend vastly any observable cosmos or branch of reality.
It makes possible to share our dreams. It makes possible all couplings of
Universal machines with themselves.
**
[SPK]
I am not sure that closure can be proven unless we are assuming
some axioms of set/logic that might not be the case. I think that the
foundation and choice axioms are troublesome, but that is a different
conversation. BTW, are you familiar with Leibniz’ Monadology?
**
The multiverse is just not the whole thing, eventually it is the border of
the ignorance of 'God''. Matter is the highly indeterminate part of the
arithmetical reality when trying to see itself. It forces the appearance of
indeterminacies for each local entities trying to figure out what it is made
of, when getting near its substitution level.
**
[SPK]
Umm, I believe that it is more than just arithmetical reality
that is trying to see itself. I bet that there is far more to “Reality” than
Arithmetic. This is where I have sympathies with people like Penrose that
balk at the idea that we are merely computations. But I think that there is
a point where we can be considered as computations and a point where we
cannot. This is where I find the idea of the universe as a ‘frozen 4d
hypercube” to be missing the point. We cannot just hand wave change away. I
see “time” as a measure of change, change in itself does not have a measure
associated to it so to not consider that Becoming is fundamental seems to be
at least myopia.
**
Now, if you want a "time" à-la Prigogine, i.e. if you want time fundamental
and primitive, then neither comp nor general relativity nor Plato, nor
Plotinus, nor any theory with a notion of block -ontological thing can
satisfy you. But this is not related to the "epiphenomena" question. With
comp, the simplest ontology is the block-(sigma_1) arithmetical truth, or
the universal dovetailing trace (UD*), but from this emerges, as seen form
inside (defined by the hypostases) a coupling consciousness/matter, but also
a coupling <what is Its name>/consciousness, and other "hypostatic"
couplings.
**
[SPK]
No, time as a notion only is meaningful when there can be a
measure of a rate of change. All Clocks work by comparing some know rate to
a measure or scale and thereby show a quantity of duration as a derivative
idea not a primitive. Time is not a substance and should never be considered
as such. Perhaps the problem is that we have not sufficiently thought about
what Time is or could not be. I recommend this paper on that subject:
<http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9408027> http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9408027
**
You may say that matter is an epiphenomenon when seen *directly* relatively
to "God". "God" probably cannot act on matter, but "God" can act on
consciousness, and consciousness can act on matter, and matter can act on
consciousness which can act on God. Very roughly speaking; You may try to
read the ennead "on the two matter" by Plotinus.
Somehow matter is what the souls do, when they fall. And it is what they
use, if only to come back. Sort of dynamical two ways road, perhaps the
famous Chu transform (you talked to me about sometimes ago).
**
[SPK]
We need to be careful that we do not ascribe to God abilities
that only we as finite entities have! How can an Infinite entity distinguish
itself from a proper subset of itself? As I understand it, it cannot!
Additionally, even God as an infinite Computational system must compute one
step of an algorithm that would compare one 3,1 manifold to another, a
computation that has been proven to be NP-Complete. I discovered this when I
was considering Leibniz’ reasons for postulating a pre-ordained harmony for
his monads…
**
If you read Plotinus, you may be unpleased by the (common among Platonists)
identification of matter with evil, but this is related to the fact that
matter is mainly built on an absolute and infinite first person(plural)
indeterminacy (cf "God" cannot tell you in advance if you will wake up in
Washington or Moscow, and your next state, as an observer, is determined by
an infinity of computations).
**
[SPK]
This indeterminacy might be the same as what I mentioned above…
But again, why work so hard to keep up the notion of an a priori computation
when we can consider the idea of an ongoing computation, where the sense of
“being computable” is one that is discovered not just assumed to exist
beforehand, one that does not need to “know it all ahead of time”. God’s
Creativity need not be limited to a special place and time.
**
Note that the Löbian machines explain both the intelligible matter (the
necessity of the quanta and their laws), and the sensible matter (the
necessity of private qualia, and their laws). And quanta appear to be
qualia, albeit first person plural sharable. And, thanks to local brains and
hands, minds can manipulate both of them.
With comp, matter is no more primitive, but still fundamental.
**
[SPK]
I still do not fully understand Löbian machines but I will keep
studying. Thank you so much for your patience and effort.
Onward!
Stephen P. King
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