Russell Standish writes (quoting SP):
> > What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the> > mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a> > parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The> > projectile doesn't "create" the parabola, which e
Jesse Mazer writes (quoting SP):
> >What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent: > >some give rise to mind, >while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't > >this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a >computer could > >never be conscious because eve
Pluto is human physix and logix
101.
John
- Original Message -
From:
Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 8:43
PM
Subject: RE: Re: Bruno's argument
John Mikes writes (quoting SP): >
you wrote: (excerpt
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent:
>some give rise to mind, >while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't
>this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a >computer could
>never be conscious because even if it exact
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what I > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for deciding > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated physically, > with each instantiation contributing to th
Thanks for digging out that summary. I met Chalmers in January this
year on a trip to Canberra, but I wasn't completely sure what his
position was.
Fromthis summary, his position actually sounds very close to that
which I argue in Theory of Nothing, however I attach a label to it:
"Emergence". Th
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > The cited article a rather emotional criticism of Chalmer's ideas.> > > Ah? OK, surely you know a better resume?
Perhaps this one: http://www.thymos.com/mind/chalmers.html
Quoting:
>>>Then Chalmers proceeds to present his own theory of consciousness, that he calls
John Mikes writes (quoting SP):
> you wrote: (excerpt):> <...The simplest explanation that comes to mind is that a brain or computer > can interact with its environment, and it is only those computations which > interact with their environment of which we can be aware. A rock may be > implement
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non co
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> > It seems to me trivially obvious that any sufficiently complex > > physical system implements any finite computation, just as any > > sufficiently large block of marble contains every marble statue of a > > given size. The difference between random noise
Quentin Anciaux writes:
> > That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and your
> > consciousness is a result of the UD. On the other hand, if your
> > consciousness is the result of physical processes in a single human brain,
> > you *can* point to the computer.
>
> When you mean computer, d
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